A Cold War between China and the US will be fought in the virtual world, via digital means. Not with nuclear warheads and border controls like the last one. But like the last Cold War, there is a growing sense of ‘them’ vs ‘us’. The stark difference between democracies and authoritarian regimes has been highlighted by the pandemic. The sharp increase in disinformation campaigns and the fight for control of critical digital infrastructure has made it clear that the next Cold War will be digital. As China rapidly expands its tech ambitions, democracies find themselves caught between digital authoritarianism and the surveillance capitalism models offered by tech giants like Facebook and Google. Neither are attractive. But what are the alternatives and can one be found before liberal democratic values are seriously undermined?
‘What does a democratic technological universe look like?’ asks Director of Alliance for Securing Democracy, Laura Rosenberger. This is a discussion that has not been given enough input she argues. She highlights the need to ‘think much more robustly about data’. How can one ensure that data is available to be used in critical technologies like AI where it is essential, without compromising individual privacy? She advocates for a much closer alliance between the US and the EU on data governance in order to counter the ‘digital authoritarianism’ promoted by China.
Alice Ekman, of the European Union Institute for Security Studies agrees that the West must face it’s fear of data surveillance. ‘If we don’t invest in the dark dimension of tech, it will be left to countries that do’ she warns. By grappling with the thorny issue of data safety and regulation, democracies like Europe and America will have a greater say in the norms and values that underpin these technologies. A competitive, ethical model may also be exported abroad to countries who do not necessarily share these values, Ekman points out.
China has invested in the creation of conglomerates of tech companies. They work together to develop comprehensive packages of infrastructure technologies that are fully compatible, Alice Ekman explains. SMART city packages like Alibaba’s ‘City Brain’, are sold to provincial governments in China and further abroad. Rosenberger warns that Chinese companies often send officials along with these products to third countries. They help with installation, training and even, in some cases, with the drafting of legislation related to the introduction of the new systems. Clearly the values that underpin such legislation are in keeping with the digital authoritarianism of the Communist regime in China. It is important therefore, that both the US and Europe are present in developing countries, maintains Rosenburger.
‘The US is at risk of losing the technology competition against China’- Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google.
Many Western tech companies have traditionally focused on producing separate components for sale, consistent with a market-based model. The lack of strong state involvement, especially in the United States, means that the West now needs to focus on creating ‘ecosystems of technology’. Such ecosystems should be compatible with one another and with our democratic values. They would then be ready for export, says Ekman.
Former CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, puts it more bluntly, ‘The US is at risk of losing the technology competition against China’. He points out that China has a national strategy with regards to technology development and global positioning. ‘What is the American response?’ he asks. Schmidt suggests that the secret of China’s success is an initial stage of ‘enormously brutal competition’ in their private sector. From this, a winner is selected who is then promoted relentlessly with the full power of the State. ‘Can you imagine if America did that?’ he asks.
Centralised control, when done well, can, in certain situations, produce better outcomes in a world involving large amounts of data and data control. Digital authoritarianism has its attractions. ‘We need a response’ says Schmidt. For the former Google CEO, it should begin with a renewed focus on investing in the development of talent and research in the sciences. He expresses concern that America is currently in danger of denying its top companies and universities, top talent because of visa restrictions.
Focus on innovation not regulation
Schmidt also points to the fact that national funding for basic scientific research is just 0.7% of GDP, and has fallen consistently since the 1950’s. He is concerned that these trends will affect ‘the great things about the West’. And admits that he is primarily concerned about making sure that ‘our innovation, our creativity and our democracy are not crushed by a well-funded autocracy.’ ‘It’s important to understand that it’s a competition and we should win it!’ he states.
Growing concerns regarding the ability of technologies like social media and AI to undermine privacy and individual rights, has caused many Western governments to focus on regulation rather than innovation. Schmidt would rather focus on ‘unleashing the creativity of the next generation’ and then regulating ‘as bad things happen’. Before we ‘fixate on regulation’ why don’t we focus on how to make the West’s technology stronger and better. Then, ‘when we compete with the Chinese model, we win as many times as we can.’
In keeping with this philosophy, he would rather not ban companies like Huawei. ‘I would like to compete with them and win.’ This may be easier said than done. Rosenberger points out that China is in the process of developing a new IP that would essentially allow Beijing to control internet traffic. Its SMART city products like Safe City by Huawei have found their way into a number of European cities. Not to mention the 5G network debates currently raging in Europe and America.
Digital authoritarianism spreads to Hong Kong
The core role played by technology in the battle between democracies and autocracies is on full display in Hong Kong, Rosenburger points out. Big tech companies like Google and Facebook have stopped handing over data to the Hong Kong government in wake of the introduction of the National Security Law. Situations such as these further highlight the problem at hand: how should liberal democracies use technology in a way that advances individual liberties?
Schmidt mentions initiatives like ORAN (open radio access networks) that are founded on the principle of decentralised control rather than the integrated systems epitomised by Huawei. Others have suggested the creation of a sort of digital Schengen zone. An internet freedom league where data flows freely without borders, underpinned by specific values and principles. There are of course many possible solutions. But the challenge is finding the right ones, in a digital world that is compressing time in a manner hitherto unseen.
