What does it mean to be sanctioned by the world’s largest authoritarian regime? In March this year, Beijing sanctioned a range of EU and UK parliamentarians, think tanks and EU committees in response to European sanctions on four Chinese officials connected to human rights violations in Xinjiang. Condemned by EU and UK officials as an attack on democracy, China’s sanctions are unprecedented in terms of their level and reach. They also directly affect the ratification of the EU- China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Three of the EU officials targeted by these sanctions recently spoke out about the personal and political implications at an event organised by the Brookings Institute.
The CAI has been a decade in the making. Widely regarded as one of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s legacy projects, the Chancellor has yet to comment on the sanctions imposed by Beijing. Green MEP and Chair of the Delegation for Relations with the People’s Republic of China, Reinhart Butikofer, claims that these sanctions are a signal of political defeat, on the part of Beijing, rather than one of strength. Beijing, he says, misread the situation in so far as they took the finalization of the CAI as concrete evidence that Berlin in particular, and Brussels and Paris too, were committed to the path of strategic autonomy. A wedge had finally been driven between the EU and the US. So sanctions against Chinese officials came as an unwelcome and unacceptable surprise to Beijing. “China forgot about the role played by parliamentarians in democracy”, notes Butifkofer.
Loss of face for Xi Jinping?
Beijing, he continues was surprised by the role played by public opinion in the decision by European Foreign Ministries to impose sanctions on selected Chinese officials due to growing concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. ‘It may amount to a huge loss of face for Xi Jingping himself” maintains the MEP. ‘He was so overly proud of having reached this deal with Merkel and now, not even three months later, the EU teams up with the UK, the US and Canada to impose sanctions’. Beijing was allegedly so angry about this, that they did not even listen to their own diplomats in Brussels. Butikofer tells us that he has information that Chinese diplomats in Brussels warned Beijing not to go as far as it did in retaliation, to no avail.
The China Relations Delegation Chair declares little surprise at finding himself on the ‘honour roll’ of Beijing’s sanctions. But he admits concern at the escalatory nature of them. However, Miriam Lexmann, fellow MEP from Slovakia, who has been in politics only a year, was surprised to find herself a target. The sanctions mean that neither she nor her family can travel to China or partake in any financial transactions linked to China. They also apply to all ‘associated persons’. The vagueness of this term might include her contacts in Hong Kong. Butikofer too admits that he will refrain from contacting his colleagues in Hong Kong out of concern for their safety. For Lexmann, the lesson is clear: ‘We need to sit down and change our policy vis-à-vis China and work more closely with our trans-Atlantic allies’.
‘There are no independent businesses currently in China’ – Dovilė Šakalienė.
Lithuanian MP, Dovilė Šakalienė, also sanctioned by Beijing, agrees that ‘standing united’ with allies ‘across the ocean’ is the way forward. “We have not forgotten the Communist methods and the Communist regime’ she says. She declares that she is wearing her new status as ‘a badge of honour’. A long time human rights defender, Šakalienė, explains that Lithuania has taken ‘very serious steps’ against Huawei. It is also expected to withdraw from China’s 17+1 programme and instead strengthen commerce with Taiwan. ‘It is important to understand that there are no independent businesses currently in China’. The MP points to her own country’s ‘extensive experience with a Communist regime’ and warns of the importance of understanding the true cost of economic co-operation with China. She describes it as ‘a mouse-trap that will not only hurt you but will cut off your head’.
Certainly, attitudes towards China have shifted significantly across Europe in the past year. This is partly linked to the pandemic. But for many Europeans it is also evidence of increasing disregard for human rights on the part of Beijing. This paired with an overtly ‘wolf warrior’ attitude on the international stage and the renewal of relations between Brussels and the White House sets the stage for a subtle but significant shift in geo-political relations. The CAI may be the first casualty. According to Reinhart Butikofer, the EU-China investment agreement is currently ‘dead as a door nail’. The European Parliament (EP) must ratify the CAI. But since MEPs from all four groups across the EP have been sanctioned by Beijing, including the China delegation and the Human Rights sub-committee, this is being viewed as an institutional attack on European democracy.
Help from the US
The two most powerful drivers behind the CAI, Merkel and Macron, are also less likely to continue to push for it so strongly, maintains Butikofer. Merkel is on her way out and Macron finds himself struggling at national level with this deal, on both the left and the right. Both Lexmann and Butikofer agree that the EP will push for increased due diligence on human rights and enhanced Foreign Direct Investment screening in order to better protect European businesses and intellectual property. Lexmann admits that the depth of what she terms the ‘IP problem’ in both the business environment and academia is of increasing concern as is the lack of a clear legal framework within which to address such concerns.
Both Lexmann and Šakalienė propose working more closely with the US who has greater experience of such issues with regards to China. Data sharing between the US and Europe will also help to provide a clearer picture of what exactly the economics costs of gaining access to the Chinese market really are, maintains Lexmann. More fundamentally, the Slovakian MEP argues that totalitarian regimes like the Chinese Communist Party have learnt how to use economic co-operation with Western democracies to strengthen their own positions. They have not changed their ideologies as previously hoped. ‘Our great failure is that we saw it happening but failed to react for economic reasons’, she says.
‘The strongest thing we have as a democracy, are our values’ – Miriam Lexmann
Ultimately, it comes down to values. Perhaps because of the more recent experiences of both Slovakia and Lithuania with authoritarianism, Lexmann and Šakalienė are both unequivocal in their belief in the central role played by values. ‘The strongest thing we have as a democracy, are our values’ says Lexmann. With this in mind, it makes sense to team up with other like-minded countries, ones who share these values. Because as Šakalienė points out, ‘We’re playing in the same team, we’re playing for democracy’.
