transatlantic relations

Transatlantic relations: Where to from here?

Crises can help put things in perspective. They often highlight weaknesses and problem areas with alarming clarity. The Transatlantic relationship is no different. A key feature of the post-war world, it has remained relatively unchanged for over half a century. Yet the Trump presidency has created divisions that few imagined possible a decade ago. The pandemic has further widened and spot-lighted the cracks in this fundamental alliance. I recently attended an event hosted by the  Brookings Institute. A variety of experts from both sides of the pond were invited to speak on how and where Transatlantic relations may be rebuilt.  

As with all struggling relationships, both parties have erred. Trump’s devil-may-care approach sits poorly with a union that is built on the need for constant compromise between 27 member states. However, America’s concerns regarding defense spending, the digital economy and most of all China, are real issues on which cooperation would benefit both sides. More than one expert at this event agreed that a win for Joe Biden in the upcoming US presidential elections would clearly impact Transatlantic relations. However, Fiona Hill, senior fellow at Brookings, points out that no matter who is sitting in the White House come January next year, it will be impossible to put the clock back to the old Cold War framework that defined Transatlantic relations for over half a century. ‘We are in a whole new era, that is different even from the 1990s or even the 2010s’ she says.  

What happened?

The issue of defense spending has been a sore point for decades. The US accounts for nearly 70% of total NATO defense spending. In terms of GDP, the US spent approximately 3.4% on defense while the average for European NATO countries was 1.55%. Germany, France and Italy all spend less than 2% of their GDP on defense spending. Last week, Germany received formal notification from the US that it would withdraw 9500 American troops stationed there. The news was greeted with mixed responses. Trump pointed out that there would still be 35 000 American troops stationed in Germany, the highest number in Europe. But it is the manner in which the decision was reached and relayed to German officials that highlights once more, the damage caused by a consistent lack of diplomacy from the current US administration.

Ivan Krastev, founding member of the European Council  on Foreign Relations and chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, notes sagely that Transatlantic relations are complex. Some European leaders, like Hungary’s Victor Orban are betting on Trump’s re-election. While for a country like Germany, the election of Democrat, Joe Biden, could put them in an awkward position with regards to China.

Germany is China’s biggest trading partner in Europe and has been reluctant to criticize the superpower for human rights violations. This includes issues like the Uighur Muslim detention camps and the ongoing pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch senior fellow at Brookings, points out that China is going to remain a difficult issue for Transatlantic relations, irrespective of who is in the White House. The Democrat’s are not expected to significantly alter the US position on China, although they might change their rhetoric.

Greater commitment to the multilateral order is important for Europe.

From the European side, Célia Belin, visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings and previously an advisor on US affairs in the French foreign ministry, highlights the need for a coordinated global approach to the pandemic, particularly in the development and distribution of a vaccine. This raises the issue of American funding of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The latter has recently come under some pressure from the US. Belin argues that for Europe, continued US support for these long-standing, if imperfect institutions, is fundamental. A commitment to uphold the world order that Europe and the US set up at the end of World War II, one that outlasts a single administration, is missing from the Trump administration.

These concerns are real. Fiona Hill notes that US withdrawal from such international institutions often results in their decline. No other power has shown the same willingness to step in and fill the gap. Nevertheless, Molly Montgomery, non-resident fellow at Brookings Institution, points out that this European Commission shows more geopolitical ambition than previous ones have done. This can be seen most clearly in its stance on regulation of the digital economy. Tax issues in particular pose a problem for Transatlantic relations as the EU prepares to take on the likes of Facebook and Amazon. Montgomery warns of ‘a real fight between US tech giants and the EU’ in the future.

‘Stop China from eating free nations from the inside’ – Victoria Nuland

Former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the US Department of State, Victoria Nuland, suggests that the US and the EU work together to protect a digital economy that supports free nations. She also highlights the need for cooperation, to stop China from ‘eating free nations from the inside’. Here she references aggressive Chinese take overs that are then used to leverage political influence. Montgomery agrees that Transatlantic relations are at their best when the focus is on common values and a shared goal. Both agree that the shared goal should be China. Montgomery suggests that a common approach to this overarching issue could provide an umbrella that will incentivize the US and the EU to find solutions on a range of other thorny issues including tax, the digital economy and even the environment.

‘Europeans have been on an extended vacation from geopolitics’ – Mark Leonard

Celia Belin also agrees that climate change, trade, health security and China all provide areas of cooperation for these two global powers. Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Europe has been ‘on an extended vacation from geopolitics for many years.’ This has made them bad partners for the US, during the good times. Now in the bad times, Europe has been forced to take more responsibility for its own affairs. This might, in turn, make the United States a more willing partner. A joint recognition that the world is a much less benign place for liberal values should and could help improve Transatlantic relations going forward.

Disinformation

Disinformation vs Democracy in a post-Covid world.

Narratives are powerful things. They shape national and individual psyches, not to mention our global understanding of phenomena like pandemics. In the age of the internet, the power and reach of narratives have increased exponentially. We live, as they say, in the age of information. How can democracies protect freedom of speech and plurality of opinions while avoiding the worst ravages of disinformation? Particularly when it is used purposefully as a weapon of political warfare? Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the US and the Hague Conversations on Conflict in the Netherlands recently discussed this problem with regards to both Russia and China. All agree that the advent of corona virus, has highlighted the extent and power of dis/misinformation.    

Disinformation has been around for decades. It existed before the arrival of the internet and indeed played a significant part in the Cold War, as Professor of Strategic Studies at John Hopkins University, Thomas Rid explains in his recent book on the subject. Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare traces the history of political warfare from 1950 to 2016. A variety of examples, mostly from the so-called Russian playbook but also from China and the US are examined in detail.

Exploiting existing divisions within a society.

The anti-Semitic campaign instigated by the KGB in 1959 at a new opened synagogue in Cologne is now something of a text-book case. It began with the graffitiing of swastikas on the sides of the place of worship, accompanied by the words ‘Jews out’. This was followed by threatening phone calls to Jewish people alongside the desecration of Jewish graves and shops. Little more was needed to re-ignite a deeply divisive narrative. Over the next two months, West German authorities recorded 833 separate anti-Jewish acts. The phenomenon spread globally. The Danish King’s summer home was graffitied and a Jewish MP in Britain was threatened with murder.

In time, evidence showed that the campaign had been instigated by two East German agents whose mission was to infiltrate far-right groups in West Germany and whip up anti-Semitic sentiment. The  idea was the brainchild of a General Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, who headed Department D, for disinformation, in the KGB.  As Professor Rid points out, sometimes the most effective disinformation campaigns are those that fan far right extremism and/or amplify existing conspiracy theories. The irony, is that instigators of such campaigns often lose control over them as happened in this case. Anti-Semitic acts spilled across the Berlin Wall into East Germany, clearly not the intention of the KGB.

‘A pandemic is the best raw material one can hope for in terms of disinformation’ – Professor Thomas Rid

‘A pandemic is the best raw material one can hope for in terms of disinformation’ says Rid. The high levels of fear and uncertainty which ensue provide the perfect breeding ground for such campaigns. Operation Denver was the name given another, now infamous KGB disinformation campaign, designed to portray HIV Aids as a biological weapon created at Fort Detrick by the US military. This campaign tapped into existing far-right conspiracy theories already circulating in the US at the time. The corona pandemic presents some similarities but also arrives at a time when divisions within US society are extremely high. This was before the Black Lives Matter protests began.

Adding yet more fuel to the fire, is the fact that it is election year in the US. Trump’s election to the White House in 2016 gave rise to the Mueller Report, an official report documenting the findings of former Special Counsel, Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 United States presidential campaign. Professor Rid maintains that the extent to which Russian disinformation impacted the results of the 2016 US elections is ‘an unknowable fact’.

He warns against ‘emotional responses’ that site Trump’s election as the result of interference by ‘foreign powers’. ‘Our perception of Russian interference is creating more problems than Russian interference itself’ he notes. Rid notes in a recent op-ed for the New York Times, that US intelligence assessment of Russian intelligence operations in the run-up to this year’s US elections is expected to focus on the support and amplification of white supremacist groups in order to incite violence. They agree that such measures are not employed to strengthen Trump but rather to weaken the United States as a whole.

‘Europe has been a laboratory for Russian disinformation for decades’ – Heather A. Conley, CSIS.

A divided society is one in which disinformation thrives. Combined with the culture of anonymity unleashed by the rise of the internet in the early 2000s, it is ‘a dream come true for disinformation actors’ says Rid. The EU’s 27 member states frequently disagree on a variety of issues. In some circumstances this plurality of views and opinions can prove helpful and healthy. But in terms of disinformation, these divisions are all too easily exploited. Heather A. Conley, Director of the Europe Program at CSIS, agrees that although Europe is becoming increasingly vigilant regarding misinformation operations, it has been ‘a laboratory for Russian disinformation for decades’.  As China has taken an increasingly active role in disinformation campaigns, following the outbreak of corona virus, Conley notes that this has caused increasing political tensions in Europe.  

Director of the European Values Center for Security Policy, Jakub Janda, explained recently in the Hague, that China has focused specifically on increasing disinformation campaigns in Europe in the last year and half. The goal; to get the EU to ‘decouple itself from the US’. He outlines the Chinese Communist Party’s objectives in Europe as follows: silencing Europe on sensitive issues like Taiwan and China’s human right’s record; deflecting blame for the corona virus and pressing hard on Europe regarding 5G, particularly Huawei’s role in it. It’s tool box he says, is similar to Russia’s but China has far more leverage because of its huge economic power.

What to do?  

Professor Rid warns against the temptation to ‘fight fire with fire’. Such an approach is problematic for several reasons he explains. Not least because, ultimately, ‘one can’t excel at democracy and disinformation at the same time’. Conley emphasises the need for the EU and the US to work together on countering disinformation campaigns directed at dividing them. While Janda points out that European countries would do well to stand together and be firm with China, particularly regarding their values.

‘This fear of China is not helpful’ Janda says. Pointing to Australia’s approach to China and Lithuania’s approach to Russia as models for future clever cooperation, he argues that a stronger, more assertive Europe will help ensure it does not ‘get crushed between the US and China’. Nevertheless, respecting a plurality of viewpoints and a range of individual freedoms does indeed make the battle more difficult. ‘Sober, fact-driven intelligence’ on all forms of information is to be recommended, and most of all, ‘Find people to disagree with’ suggests Professor Rid.  

China

How will China’s tarnished image affect global relations post-corona?

China’s international image has been decades in the making. Although democracy and human rights have never been high on the Communist Party’s agenda – phenomenal economic growth paired with a reasonable record of line towing with regards to international organisations and diplomacy resulted in acceptance by many Western nations of China’s authoritarian regime. Some even suggested that China might provide an alternative model to Western capitalist democracies for developing nations. But much has changed in the last 6 months. Corona virus has placed China under the world spotlight, not in a manner of Beijing’s choosing. What are the implications for global relations going forward?

Some of the less savoury aspects of just how the massive apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party works have become increasingly clear. From the Hong Kong protests to the mass internment camps of China’s Uighur Muslims, along with advanced surveillance schemes and claims of the debt trap diplomacy of its Belt and Road initiative – China’s image is showing signs of strain. And this was before the arrival of corona virus. The live and let live approach seems ever more difficult to justify. But what are the alternatives? Hong Kong provides a poignant example of just how difficult a change in approach may be.  

Increasing tensions between China and Hong Kong are perhaps one of the greatest sources of embarrassment for a nation for whom ‘face saving’ is essential. After months of protest by pro-democracy groups, local Hong Kong elections showed that the vast majority of Hong Kongers support the protesters. Contrary to narratives portraying the protesters as criminal thugs, bent on disrupting one of China’s most prosperous financial hubs, these results surprised even Beijing.

The end of One Country Two Systems?

In contrast to Beijing’s trust in the power of economic prosperity to ensure compliance, a combination of factors have created a storm that has proved difficult to contain. For years now, Hong Kong has seen its basic rights eroded and ‘reinterpreted’ by Beijing and its supporters. This, in combination with a lack of social welfare investment in Hong Kong, soaring house prices and erosion of job opportunities by an influx of mainlanders have created rising levels of anger and discontent among Hong Kong’s youth. Beijing has now announced its intention to introduce national security legislation in Hong Kong. It will be inserted directly into the city’s Basic Law framework, by-passing local legislative processes. Widespread international criticism has ensued.

Close on the heels of the Hong Kong protests and Taiwan’s choice of pro-democracy leader, Tsai Ing-Wen, in January elections, came the Xinjian Papers. Over 400 pages of leaked documents, detailing exactly how ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region would be ‘re-educated’ in government organised ‘training schools’. These internal documents were leaked to the New York Times by a concerned member of the Communist Party. They reveal just how different the sanitized narrative of job training centers for China’s Muslim minority is from the chilling reality of exactly how officials should go about organising the most extensive internment campaign since the Mao era.

Black-listed on China’s social credit system?

Beijing’s social credit system, due to come into full effect in 2020, exemplifies the kind of social control of which any self-respecting totalitarian regime would be proud. Although commentators say that its reach is still patchy, the ideas behind it are draconian. Credit is not only gained, it can also be lost and an individual may be black-listed as a result. If this happens, rights can be removed, including one’s right to travel, buy property or take out a loan. When this happens, as it did to Chinese journalist, Liu Hu, there is little one can do. There was no file, no police warrant, no advance notification, in his case. A lack of due process, makes recourse to justice extremely difficult.  

These are just some of Beijing’s less savoury projects. Much has been written about the so-called debt-trap diplomacy of its Belt and Road Initiative. Designed to bolster China’s image and extend its influence as a superpower, this trillion dollar project was coming under pressure before the pandemic. Global economic slowdown and increasing concerns about a lack of transparency surrounding China’s lending schemes were proving problematic. Rising debt levels associated with the pandemic have meant that many of China’s developing world debtors are unable to meet repayment schedules. China was a signatory to a recent pledge by the Group of 20 rich economies to cease collecting interest from poor countries for the rest of the year. However many large Belt and Road loans are “not applicable for debt relief” China has stated.

China’s struggle to control the Covid 19 narrative.

The irony of course is that the source of the pandemic has been traced to China, specifically, the wet markets of Wuhan. This has become an increasingly sore point for Beijing as Covid 19 continues to cause death and economic destruction across the globe. Numerous countries have called for an independent inquiry into the issue both with regards to the actions of the Chinese government and those of the World Health Organisation. So far Beijing has rebutted these requests and focused instead on forcefully promoting a narrative designed to salvage something of China’s international image. China as role model for its containment of the virus and later as benefactor to other, less prepared countries. It continues to insist on Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO, although the latter’s handling of the pandemic has been among the most effective in the world.

What does the future hold? At a recent Chatham House rules event, a number of experts on China drew on the country’s history in order to  provide a context for its future path. More than one pointed to the importance of the Chinese narrative of their history staring in the 5th century BC. Their power and dominance continued right up until 1900. After which came the so-called century of humiliation for China. This ended in the 1970’s as China came out of isolation and focused on inclusion in global governance institutions and wider international acceptance. By 2010, China was ready to step forward into a more assertive role . In the last few years in particular, its actions in the South China Sea, border disputes with India and an ongoing trade war with the US highlight an increasingly assertive approach to international relations.

Is it simply a matter of time?

Rising Chinese nationalism has traditionally gone hand-in-hand with the nation’s increasing global dominance. Yet the political and economic fall out of the pandemic have upset this trajectory. China’s image has been undeniably tarnished by the corona virus. What’s more, the ensuing scrutiny has only served to highlight other areas of dubious dealings. Ultimately, the answer lies with the Chinese people themselves. Will the Communist Party continue to be able to provide sufficient prosperity to quieten a desire for more individual rights and freedoms? History suggests not, especially given events in Hong Kong and Taiwan. But the time scale of rising discontent, is also a major factor and that is far more difficult to gauge.  

China social credit

The price of trust – will China’s social credit system deliver?

In a world where virtual reality and fake news are becoming the norm, demand for that highly prized commodity, trust, is rising. In China, the speed of change on a scale hitherto unknown together with a lack of political transparency, has created a large deficit of this vital ingredient. I spoke with researchers from the Leiden Asia Centre on the social credit system, due to be rolled out nationwide this year. 

What is the social credit system and how does it work?

The Chinese government provided the first clear definition of what the social credit system should look like in 2014. According to the system’s founding document, the scheme should “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step.” Since then, Dr. Rogier Creemers explains, the government has ‘opened it up to tender’. The result: ‘a huge variety of systems across the country driven by the general principles and spirit of social credit’.

Thus, in 2015 there were 11 pilot schemes but this rapidly grew to 32 and by 2017 there were 623 social credit systems on offer across the country. Thus Associate Professor, Liu Jun, of the University of Copenhagen, points out that currently there is no unified social credit system in China. Some are government led and some are corporate led systems involving companies like Tencent and Alibaba. Liu Jun goes on to draw parallels with Aadhaar in India, the world’s largest biometric database and Germany’s schufa system for credit rating.

However, the Chinese approach, although not yet fully operational, appears to be much more far reaching. PhD candidate, Adam Knight, has spent time in China researching the reality of the social credit system. He explains that the Chinese government has selected 28 model cities from across the country on which others will base their social credit systems.

One that stands out in particular is Rongcheng in Shandong province. It is a relatively small city by Chinese standards, 650 000 people, and represents, ‘a very distilled microcosm of the national system at large’. It is here that Adam Knight conducted his research into the nuts and bolts of the system on the ground. He explains that it is the Credit Management Department’s job to gather information, decide on punishments and rewards and catalog behaviours.

Minus 50 points for spreading rumours on WeChat.

Knight provides an example of the taxi industry. Each taxi driver in Rongcheng is given a social credit ranking. They are pooled in groups of ten with the ‘best’ or most honest taxi driver placed in charge. This person is responsible for reporting misbehaviour from other members of the group. The information is used to create a star rating for each driver which is displayed on the front of the taxi. Other examples include actions like 10 points for clearing snow off the pavement, minus 5 points for arguing with your neighbour or minus 50 points for spreading rumours on WeChat. Drunk driving will probably cause your score to plummet. But donating to a charity or volunteering in one of the city’s programmes will earn you social credit. If your score drops below a certain level you may be banned from receiving government subsidies or attending university.

How is this data being collected? Officials from the department of Credit Management insist that anything that influences your points needs to be backed with official documents. However, Knight explains that there are well over a thousand volunteers in the Rongcheng area whose job it is to ‘snoop on their neighbours’, pen and paper in hand. These social credit records are then passed up on a monthly or sometimes a yearly basis. Cash incentives further muddy the waters of the system and result in data of varying quality. In theory, a person should be given 10 days notification if their social credit score is going to change. But in reality this seldom happens, Knight explains. Inaccurate data undermines one’s ability to appeal against the system.  

Social credit system ‘is a tool designed to enhance trust in the market place’ – Dr. Creemers 

Chinese media tends to provide what Knight terms, ‘an event driven perspective’ on the introduction of the social credit system. It is presented as life-improving  and there is little focus on issues of surveillance or privacy. Chinese law scholar, Dr. Creemers, who argues that China is largely ‘misunderstood’ due to lack of genuine interest from the West, admits that there is ‘no notion of a generalised right of privacy in Chinese law’. Instead, rules on data protection are ‘deeply contextualised’.

Data is not therefore seen as the personal property  of citizens and is often collected without their permission. Creemers admits that he doesn’t see any form of GDPR coming to China soon. But describes the social credit system as ‘a tool designed to enhance trust in the market place’.  Until recently few Chinese citizens had a bank account. This makes assessing credit worthiness difficult, particularly in a country as large as China. A lot of government held information in China is still on paper. Thus the social credit system is also about digitizing these paper records.

‘China is in a very serious trust crisis’ – Zheng Yefu

But the issue of trust goes deeper than this. “China is in a very serious trust crisis,” said Zheng Yefu, a sociologist at Peking University and author of the book “On Trust.” Reasons for this are varied. Some cite the Cultural Revolution and other political changes that ended traditional societal structures designed to ensure trust. Others say that the demands of a market economy in a society that lacks a well-developed legal and regulatory system is to blame.

The government’s recent morality campaign – ‘Eight virtues and Eight Shames’ is evidence of growing concerns in this regard. But as some commentators point out, the government itself is far from transparent. The release of inaccurate government statistics for political purposes, a general lack of accountability and systemic corruption within the party ranks are hardly the ingredients of which trust is made.  

Willing to forego some privacy if it means less fraud and crime.

Ethnographic research by Xinyuan Wang of University College London carried out over a period of 16 months suggests that Chinese citizens view the situation quite differently. Focusing on Shanghai, Wang found that most were willing to forego some privacy if it meant less fraud and crime. Food and drug safety are particular areas of concern. However many also associate the West’s ‘mature credit system’ with high levels of trustworthiness. The rule of law and the trust and transparency that it fosters cannot be replaced by the Communist Party’s social credit system. Perhaps one day Chinese citizens will know this, from first-hand experience.  

China

China: an increasingly precarious international image? (5 min)

China’s international image has been decades in the making. Although democracy and human rights have never been high on the Communist Party’s agenda – phenomenal economic growth paired with a reasonable record of line towing with regards to international organisations and diplomacy resulted in acceptance by many Western nations of China’s authoritarian regime. Some even suggested that China might provide an alternative model to Western capitalist democracies for developing nations.  But in just a few short months, much has changed.

Some of the less savoury aspects of just how the massive apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party works have been highlighted. From the Hong Kong protests to the mass internment camps of China’s Uighur Muslims, along with advanced surveillance schemes and claims of the debt trap diplomacy of its Belt and Road initiative – China is coming under increasing pressure, particularly from the US. For those who favoured a live and let live approach, because, let’s be honest, money talks, such an option is increasingly difficult to justify.  

Increasing tensions between China and Hong Kong are perhaps one of the greatest sources of embarrassment for a nation for whom ‘face saving’ is essential. After months of protest by pro-democracy groups, local Hong Kong elections have shown that the vast majority of Hong Kongers support the protesters. Contrary to narratives portraying the protesters as criminal thugs, bent on disrupting one of China’s most prosperous financial hubs, these results have apparently surprised even Beijing.

For years Hong Kong has seen its rights eroded by involvement from Beijing.

In contrast to Beijing’s trust in the power of economic prosperity to ensure compliance, a combination of factors have created a storm that is proving difficult to contain. For years now, Hong Kong has seen its basic rights eroded and ‘reinterpreted’ by Beijing and those who support it. This, in combination with a lack of social welfare programmes in Hong Kong, soaring house prices and erosion of job opportunities by an influx of mainlanders have created rising levels of anger and discontent among Hong Kong’s youth.  

Close on the heels of the Hong Kong protests and Taiwan’s increasingly pro-democratic stance in the run-up to January elections, come the Xinjian Papers. Over 400 pages of leaked documents, detailing exactly how ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region would be ‘re-educated’ in government organised ‘training schools’. These internal documents were leaked to the New York Times by a concerned member of the Communist Party. They reveal just how different the sanitized narrative of job training centers for China’s Muslim minority is from the chilling reality of exactly how officials should go about organising the most extensive internment campaign since the Mao era.

What happens to party members who dissent?

Documents went so far as to advise officials on how to handle awkward conversations with returning students who found their relatives gone. Lines like ‘Freedom is only possible when this virus in their thinking is eradicated and they are in good health’ bear a striking resemblance to the doublespeak of Orwell’s seminal work on totalitarianism, 1984. The leaked documents also provide insights into what happens to those party members who dissent. Especially high-ranking ones, such as Wang Yongzhi,  who did not ‘stick to rounding up everyone who should be rounded up’.  Mr. Wang who also defied the regime by ordering the release of 7000 camp inmates, was subject to public character assassination, stripped of his position and prosecuted.

Even more recently, China has launched compulsory face scans when registering users of new phones at stores across China. Those registering a new phone number will, according to reports, have to record themselves turning their head and blinking. For years now China has focused on matching internet users with their real identities. Social media firms were required to implement real-name registration almost a decade ago. The Chinese government insists that such measures are in the interests of all citizens as they will boost cyber-security and reduce internet fraud. This culture of surveillance dovetails almost seamlessly with the rise of artificial intelligence and big data.

Black-listed on China’s social credit system?

Beijing’s social credit system, due to come into full effect in 2020, exemplifies the kind of social control of which any self-respecting totalitarian regime would be proud. Although commentators say that its reach is still patchy and it is doubtful that it will be ready by next year, the ideas behind it are draconian. Credit is not only gained, it can also be lost and an individual may be black-listed as a result. If this happens, rights can be removed, including one’s right to travel, buy property or take out a loan. When this happens, as it did to Chinese journalist, Liu Hu, there is little one can do. There was no file, no police warrant, no advance notification, in his case. The lack of due process, makes recourse to justice extremely difficult.  

These are just a few of some of Beijing’s less savoury projects. Much has been written about the so-called debt-trap diplomacy of its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, China’s increasingly proactive stance when it comes to territorial claims in the South China Sea and Antarctica have also been noted. There are also a number of individual cases that raise concern. Australian journalist and blogger, Yang Hengjun, has been held in China since January. Details regarding his alleged offence are sparse but he has been charged with spying.

‘Democracy peddler’ held for months without access to his lawyers.

Australian authorities are concerned about his ailing health and the fact that he continues to be denied access to his lawyers. His case is due to be heard in China, in March. The conviction rate for those accused of a crime is 99% in China. It is typically preceded by a confession obtained through a long and secretive detention process. For self-confessed Chinese spy, Wang Liqiang, death is fairly certain should his request for asylum in Australia be denied. Wang’s story is still under investigation by Australian authorities. Beijing claims that he was convicted of fraud in China and that his claims are ‘absurd’.

What does the future hold? At a recent Chatham House rules event I attended on China’s role in global economic governance, a number of experts on China drew on the country’s history in order to  provide a context for its future path. More than one drew attention to the Chinese view that the nation dominated the international system between the 5th century BC, right up until 1900. The following decades were a time of humiliation and isolation for China. This ended in the 1970’s when China returned to the international system. Focusing on inclusion in global governance institutions and wider international acceptance, China was ready to step forward into a more assertive role by 2010.

Is it simply a matter of time?

Now, rising Chinese nationalism goes hand-in-hand with the nation’s increasing global dominance. The issue of course, is the Chinese people themselves. Will increased power and prosperity be enough to quieten a desire for more individual rights and freedoms? History suggests not, especially given events in Hong Kong and Taiwan. But the time scale of rising discontent, is also a major factor and that, is far more difficult to gauge.  

The trouble with Hong Kong (4 min)

As protests in Hong Kong escalate, the tensions inherent in the one country, two systems approach are becoming increasingly apparent, in spite of Beijing’s claims to the contrary. Hong Kong has one of the freest economies in the world but what of its political system? What is the price of freedom and who is willing to pay it?

I arrived in Hong Kong in 2014. As a new member of Hong Kong’s large expat community, I  remember making my way down to the streets Mong Kok, one of the centers of the so-called Umbrella Revolution. Mong Kok is a large, working man’s district known among tourists for its markets. The ordered, peacefulness of the protests was difficult to appreciate unless seen first-hand. Students had set up desks in order to do their homework and tents and bottles of water were neatly stored for later use. All agreed that this was ‘typical Hong Kong’ – orderly and law-abiding to the extreme. These protests eventually petered out as increasing numbers of the city’s residents grew alarmed about the economic consequences of movements like Occupy Central that brought the CBD to a standstill.

Hong Kong’s colonial history is not China’s

Although Hong Kong is geographically and ethnically part of China, this small territory has enjoyed a very different history, at least for the last couple of centuries. Under British control for more than 150 years, Hong Kong developed in quite a different manner from mainland China, which came under Communist rule in 1949. With British handover in 1997, Hong Kong became a special administrative region within China. This meant that for the next 50 years, at least, the territory would have its own mini-constitution, called the Basic Law. Under Basic Law various rights including an independent legal system, based on the English Common Law, multiple political parties, free speech and freedom of assembly were guaranteed. But the word of the law and the spirit of the law can diverge. Since 1997, a variety of interpretations of these laws by Beijing have clashed with those of Hong Kong citizens. This in turn has led to numerous protests over the years as Hong Kongers have seen their special rights hollowed out by interference from Beijing.  

Greater integration, greater economic prosperity?

The one country, two systems mantra, is one which Beijing has repeatedly reinforced in its  approach to Hong Kong. Building on notions of shared ethnicity and a common desire for economic prosperity, the Chinese Communist Party has made no secret of the fact that it sees this approach as a vehicle for peaceful, prosperous integration. Indeed Hong Kong and Macau are set to play key roles in an ambitious economic development plan released in February this year. The region, termed the Greater Bay Area (GBA), incorporates 11 cities, of which the 9  least developed are in Guangdong province.

The GBA plan is designed to build a cooperative framework between Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong to facilitate integration, including that of all three regulatory environments. Such suggestions have understandably given rise to concern. The GBA is an excellent example of how the mainland views  prosperity and integration as synonymous. It fits very well with the long-term approach of the Chinese Communist Party –  prioritize economic growth and prosperity and this will foster the necessary loyalty and contentment among citizens. Why would such an approach not work with Hong Kong?

The price of freedom

The problem is political . Specifically political freedom. The kind which Hong Kong’s Basic Law was designed to provide. Although the current protests were triggered by an attempt to push through a controversial extradition law, protesters are now calling for more. They are demanding the universal suffrage which was promised them in 2017 but never materialised. Some are even demanding the liberation of Hong Kong itself. Although the most vocal and recently violent protesters are found among the younger generation – one expat onlooker described a recent violent protest in Sha Tin, as ‘a massive temper tantrum with a load of kids – underlying problems run deep. Since hand-over, economic inequality in Hong Kong has grown. In one of the richest economies in the world, social systems are remarkably underdeveloped. Hong Kongers increasingly see this situation as a result of indifferent leadership imposed by Beijing.

For the younger generation the situation is intolerable. One Hong Kong student, 19 year old Frances Hui, wrote, ‘ I am from a city owned by a county that I don’t belong to’. The demands of young pro-democracy leaders like, Joshua Wong, highlight the increasing ideological differences between Hong Kong and mainland China. Beijing has very little experience dealing with such protests. The Communist Party’s response has typically been immediate and violent suppression. Tienanmen Square is a case in point. As are the thinly veiled threats of the Chinese police force performing riot drills on the Shenzhen/Hong Kong border. Beijing officials have recently reiterated that they will not allow Hong Kong’s beleaguered Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, to resign and that protesters must be punished.

The doublethink of ‘one country, two systems’

A number of local commentators have suggested more democratic ways of de-escalating the violence. These include investigating police violence, aswell as attacks by men dressed in white believed to have Triad links, re-evaluating the Basic Law and addressing the housing shortage, as a start. But Beijing is unaccustomed to this sort of democratic  compromise. Unquestioning loyalty and obedience from citizens is the norm. It is also what the Communist Party system relies upon to remain in power. And there’s the rub. One country will struggle to support two systems as radically different as those of Hong Kong and its mainland guardian. The days of such an approach were thus numbered from the start. Only Beijing doublespeak could suggest otherwise. ‘No matter what happens to the protest movement, we will reclaim the democracy that belongs to us, because time is on our side.’ Wong wrote in a recent article for the New York Times. Perhaps it is.