Disinformation

Disinformation vs Democracy in a post-Covid world.

Narratives are powerful things. They shape national and individual psyches, not to mention our global understanding of phenomena like pandemics. In the age of the internet, the power and reach of narratives have increased exponentially. We live, as they say, in the age of information. How can democracies protect freedom of speech and plurality of opinions while avoiding the worst ravages of disinformation? Particularly when it is used purposefully as a weapon of political warfare? Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the US and the Hague Conversations on Conflict in the Netherlands recently discussed this problem with regards to both Russia and China. All agree that the advent of corona virus, has highlighted the extent and power of dis/misinformation.    

Disinformation has been around for decades. It existed before the arrival of the internet and indeed played a significant part in the Cold War, as Professor of Strategic Studies at John Hopkins University, Thomas Rid explains in his recent book on the subject. Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare traces the history of political warfare from 1950 to 2016. A variety of examples, mostly from the so-called Russian playbook but also from China and the US are examined in detail.

Exploiting existing divisions within a society.

The anti-Semitic campaign instigated by the KGB in 1959 at a new opened synagogue in Cologne is now something of a text-book case. It began with the graffitiing of swastikas on the sides of the place of worship, accompanied by the words ‘Jews out’. This was followed by threatening phone calls to Jewish people alongside the desecration of Jewish graves and shops. Little more was needed to re-ignite a deeply divisive narrative. Over the next two months, West German authorities recorded 833 separate anti-Jewish acts. The phenomenon spread globally. The Danish King’s summer home was graffitied and a Jewish MP in Britain was threatened with murder.

In time, evidence showed that the campaign had been instigated by two East German agents whose mission was to infiltrate far-right groups in West Germany and whip up anti-Semitic sentiment. The  idea was the brainchild of a General Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, who headed Department D, for disinformation, in the KGB.  As Professor Rid points out, sometimes the most effective disinformation campaigns are those that fan far right extremism and/or amplify existing conspiracy theories. The irony, is that instigators of such campaigns often lose control over them as happened in this case. Anti-Semitic acts spilled across the Berlin Wall into East Germany, clearly not the intention of the KGB.

‘A pandemic is the best raw material one can hope for in terms of disinformation’ – Professor Thomas Rid

‘A pandemic is the best raw material one can hope for in terms of disinformation’ says Rid. The high levels of fear and uncertainty which ensue provide the perfect breeding ground for such campaigns. Operation Denver was the name given another, now infamous KGB disinformation campaign, designed to portray HIV Aids as a biological weapon created at Fort Detrick by the US military. This campaign tapped into existing far-right conspiracy theories already circulating in the US at the time. The corona pandemic presents some similarities but also arrives at a time when divisions within US society are extremely high. This was before the Black Lives Matter protests began.

Adding yet more fuel to the fire, is the fact that it is election year in the US. Trump’s election to the White House in 2016 gave rise to the Mueller Report, an official report documenting the findings of former Special Counsel, Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 United States presidential campaign. Professor Rid maintains that the extent to which Russian disinformation impacted the results of the 2016 US elections is ‘an unknowable fact’.

He warns against ‘emotional responses’ that site Trump’s election as the result of interference by ‘foreign powers’. ‘Our perception of Russian interference is creating more problems than Russian interference itself’ he notes. Rid notes in a recent op-ed for the New York Times, that US intelligence assessment of Russian intelligence operations in the run-up to this year’s US elections is expected to focus on the support and amplification of white supremacist groups in order to incite violence. They agree that such measures are not employed to strengthen Trump but rather to weaken the United States as a whole.

‘Europe has been a laboratory for Russian disinformation for decades’ – Heather A. Conley, CSIS.

A divided society is one in which disinformation thrives. Combined with the culture of anonymity unleashed by the rise of the internet in the early 2000s, it is ‘a dream come true for disinformation actors’ says Rid. The EU’s 27 member states frequently disagree on a variety of issues. In some circumstances this plurality of views and opinions can prove helpful and healthy. But in terms of disinformation, these divisions are all too easily exploited. Heather A. Conley, Director of the Europe Program at CSIS, agrees that although Europe is becoming increasingly vigilant regarding misinformation operations, it has been ‘a laboratory for Russian disinformation for decades’.  As China has taken an increasingly active role in disinformation campaigns, following the outbreak of corona virus, Conley notes that this has caused increasing political tensions in Europe.  

Director of the European Values Center for Security Policy, Jakub Janda, explained recently in the Hague, that China has focused specifically on increasing disinformation campaigns in Europe in the last year and half. The goal; to get the EU to ‘decouple itself from the US’. He outlines the Chinese Communist Party’s objectives in Europe as follows: silencing Europe on sensitive issues like Taiwan and China’s human right’s record; deflecting blame for the corona virus and pressing hard on Europe regarding 5G, particularly Huawei’s role in it. It’s tool box he says, is similar to Russia’s but China has far more leverage because of its huge economic power.

What to do?  

Professor Rid warns against the temptation to ‘fight fire with fire’. Such an approach is problematic for several reasons he explains. Not least because, ultimately, ‘one can’t excel at democracy and disinformation at the same time’. Conley emphasises the need for the EU and the US to work together on countering disinformation campaigns directed at dividing them. While Janda points out that European countries would do well to stand together and be firm with China, particularly regarding their values.

‘This fear of China is not helpful’ Janda says. Pointing to Australia’s approach to China and Lithuania’s approach to Russia as models for future clever cooperation, he argues that a stronger, more assertive Europe will help ensure it does not ‘get crushed between the US and China’. Nevertheless, respecting a plurality of viewpoints and a range of individual freedoms does indeed make the battle more difficult. ‘Sober, fact-driven intelligence’ on all forms of information is to be recommended, and most of all, ‘Find people to disagree with’ suggests Professor Rid.  

Democracy: (still) the answer to Europe’s identity crisis.(4 min)

Is democracy in crisis? Looking at Britain’s Brexit, Trump’s America and Salvini’s Italy, it is tempting to say ‘yes’. Common explanations have located the rise of populism in a potent mix of globalization and financial crisis. Yet two eminent political scientists, Francis Fukuyama and Dominique Moïsi, point instead to a crisis of identity. Speaking in Amsterdam recently, the American and the Frenchman highlighted the European Union as a source of both hope and fear for the future of liberal democracy.

Fukuyama admits that identity is the ‘master concept’ of his most recent book of the same name. In it, he argues  that the rise of populism is linked to a crisis of identity rather than economics. It is linked to a rising need for recognition by many of those affected by globalization. The desire to be recognised is universal. Yet, right now, invisibility is pervasive in society, he maintains. ‘The older white working class are feeling particularly invisible right now’. Ironically, both capitalist and Marxist schools of thought closely associate recognition with material wealth. Fukuyama accuses both Marxists and contemporary free market economists of viewing the world in ‘the same narrow-minded, materialistic way – they ignore the power of ideas’.

Macron is too bright, too young and accomplished, too handsome. – Moïsi

For his part, Moïsi locates the roots of populism in three key words: Anger, Humiliation and Nostalgia. Similarly Fukuyama, argues that the crisis we now face in Europe is one of both ethics and identity. The anger at what he calls the elite, is in part a product of the ‘explosion in inequality, real or perceived’. This in turn is a result of the humiliation which is reflected in movements like the gilles jaunes in France. A little humiliation can be a good thing, Moïsi says, as it can inspire one to greater things. However too much humiliation is very bad. For those in Europe who feel they have been ‘left behind’ by everything that is young, new and global, their sense of humiliation is overwhelming. Someone like Macron, increases this sense of humiliation simply by being what he is – too bright, too young and accomplished, too handsome.

If one is confident, an individual has no problem being French or British or Bulgarian and European. He blames his generation for failing what he terms, ‘the interrogation of identity’. ‘We have failed to teach a pedagogy of freedom and peace to the new Europeans’. And in spite of the optimism of Chancellor Kohl of Germany in the 1990’s, that the Erasmus programme, together with a combination of Italian pizza and German beer would prove sufficient to create a generation of young Europeans, it has not proved quite so simple. Those who have always lived in peace and freedom have great difficulty in truly understanding the value of these things.

‘European citizenship is only metaphoric.’ – Fukuyama

Both writers agree that the nation state has traditionally provided the framework around which institutions of a liberal democracy can cohere and gain credibility. However, nationalism as a source of identity can and has caused problems. It is frequently linked to notions of ethnic and/or religious superiority. Moïsi makes reference to Brexit as a prime example of this phenomenon. ‘Brexit is an example of a country shooting itself in the foot in the most dramatic but illuminating manner.’ For Fukuyama, the European Union is a union of ideas/ideals more than anything else. As such it may well represent the beginnings of his own utopian vision for the end of history – an international community, regulated by global structures based on the rule of law. Yet he points to the fact that power continues to sit at the national level in the EU. As such, ‘European citizenship is only metaphoric’.    

But the European Union has the potential to represent the sorts of ideas/ideals around which people can come together, in order to create the kind of broad, inclusive identities that Fukuyama lauds. Often accused of being merely a technocracy, its liberal institutions and ideals are  designed to help protect the right of individuals to choose. The right to choose, Fukuyama maintains, lies at the heart of human dignity. Indeed democracy itself ‘is based on a recognition of this basic human dignity.’ Thus, notions of identity should be centered on ideas rather than ethnicity, religion or material wealth. However, he makes it clear that this process begins with a willingness to listen to and accept opposing views. He suggests that metropolitan elites are just as guilty of this as their less educated counter-parts.

‘Will Europe be at the table or on the menu?’ – Moïsi

Even among the younger generations, Dominique Moïsi highlights the lack of  enthusiasm and appetite for the European Union. They are far more engaged in the fate of the kingdom in Game of Thrones he notes with typical irony. But Moïsi is unequivocal in his response; ‘what is at stake, is the future of democracy’. In a world where there is less America and more China and Russia, the question for Europe is: ‘will it be at the table or on the menu?’. For the first time in centuries, the Western model is being challenged by China’s alternative. It is a model that  does not include liberal democracy. For Moïsi, China forces Europeans to defend what it is they truly believe in, unlike other threats such as migration. It forces one to be excellent.

Perhaps the key issue here is trust. As Fukuyama points out, the trust of voters can never be assumed, based simply on the moral superiority of liberalism. The ongoing democracy protests in Hong Kong, highlight similar issues, on the opposite side of the world. A sense of identity, separate from mainland China, is underpinned by a growing lack of trust in the city’s leadership. The outcome is difficult to foretell but as Moïsi said, ‘One cannot play with history lightly’.