democratic deficit

March 18, 2021 Souwie

Europe is a dirty word for many national politicians in EU Member States. The Netherlands is no exception. This year, for the first time, the #EUolifant (EU elephant) went viral on twitter prior to the elections, hinting that a change might be underway. The rise of pan-European party, Volt, may be part of this shift. But how deep does this change really go and how has the pandemic reinforced the somewhat stultified status quo in Dutch politics? What are the implications for democracy at both national and European level?

The national elections here in the Netherlands have raised the perennial questions of housing shortages, healthcare and education. But this year, the issue of Europe is also here. Perhaps the pan-European response to the pandemic is responsible for this shift. Despite the very vocal protests from the Dutch government against the introduction of corona bonds last year, more Europe seems inevitable. Are attitudes are shifting in a country where ‘less-Europe’ has long been a cherished campaign slogan for national politicians?

The democratic deficit

For years, the EU has been accused of running on a democratic deficit. This refers to the lack of democratic mandate from EU citizens who vote at national level for local politicians. They are unable to vote directly for those that represent them at the EU parliament in Brussels. In national political debates, Brussels is conveniently used as a scapegoat for much that is wrong while local politicians take the credit for what goes right. EU citizens themselves thus remain confused or worse, blissfully ignorant of the vital role that Europe plays in their prosperity. In Dutch politics this phenomenon has been particularly pronounced.

Common myths regarding the EU abound, even among professional, educated members of the electorate. Perhaps best understood as a strongly held belief that the EU is a money-hungry bureaucracy in which the Netherlands has too little say. Stats show that in fact the average Dutch citizen gains far more than s/he contributes toward the EU. And, that the number of bureaucrats in Brussels is comparable to those in the Dutch government! As journalist and lecturer, Caroline de Gruyter, pointed out at a recent discussion in Amsterdam, Brexit has made it easier to talk more positively about Europe in the Netherlands. There is general, if unvoiced acknowledgement that the Netherlands, as ‘the port of Europe’, needs the EU, says de Gruyter.

Integration in disguise

De Gruyter argues that the Dutch are in fact very active in Europe. She compares Dutch politicians to shoppers out with their list of priorities in the EU, looking for like-minded partners with whom to do business. ‘Lots of things are happening in Europe at the moment and the Dutch are in all of them’ assures de Gruyter. But after the fuss they made about the corona bonds, politicians have to be careful how they play it, she explains. Certainly, Mark Rutte’s strategy regarding the EU seems to be ‘integration in disguise’ notes Luiza Bialasiewicz, Associate Professor in the Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam. It is definitely something at which he has become very good, agrees Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House. Bergsen believes that this approach will continue for the foreseeable future.

In spite of expectations that the pandemic might cause shifts in the Dutch political landscape, Bergsen admits that this has not really occurred. De Gruyter puts it down to a tendency, seen across Europe, to ‘rally around the flag’. Matt Steinglass, Europe correspondent for the Economist, suggests that there has been a consensus on the political left, not to attack the government in a time of crisis. He argues that the left ‘were already low but the pandemic has left them paralyzed’. The result; a stultified political landscape in the Netherlands, underpinned by a somewhat misplaced sense of complacency that all is well. Steinglass cites the country’s relatively poor handling of the Covid crisis as evidence of an inability to change in response to changing circumstances.

Left out

Arun Chaudhary, American campaign advisor to Obama and now the Dutch Labour Party, argues that although there are a lot of parties in the Dutch system, ‘when you look at the data, you still have just two teams’. One team, he argues, has a clear captain – referring to Mark Rutte, while the other, left-wing team ‘just has kids’. Perhaps this is why there has been a lack of real opposition from the left to the current government. Chaudhary agrees that Rutte in particular, is extremely well established as a leader. He is more popular than his party and this makes criticism of him risky for opponents. The pandemic too, ‘slowed the election’, he agrees.

Chaudhary points out that the political left has lost much of its working class support because it has ceased to deliver the kind of tangible results typically expected by its supporters. He describes the left as ‘more of a life-style choice’ for the professional middle class. For these people politics is not so much about community building. It is comparable rather to the gym or club you join, the newspaper you read or the vacation destination you choose. This phenomenon helps explain the rise of populism across Europe. Perhaps it also explains the lack of genuine debate around the issue of Europe. It is the average working wo/man who needs to be convinced of the importance of Europe in their lives. But which team is able and willing to do this?

Problem lies at national level

As the initiators of the #EUolifant twitter campaign point out, the lack of genuine debate around Europe’s role in Dutch political decisions was still largely absent in the recent election campaigns. Debate at national level on vital decisions involving Europe is central to the democratic process. A lack of local debate on issues such as coronabonds and vaccination passports means that national politicians may find themselves out of touch with changing attitudes toward Europe. It also leaves the public with the familiar feeling of being left out of the loop when it comes to EU policies that affect their lives. Perhaps, as the EUolifant initiators point out, the problem of the democratic deficit does not lie in Brussels but much closer to home, at the national parliament level, right here in the Hague.

September 18, 2019 Souwie

Europe is in need of a ‘democratic transplant’. So says Sorbonne Professor, Antoine Vauchez, co-author of the Manifesto for the Democratization of Europe (2018), now translated into 9 languages. Signed by over 100 000 people, the Manifesto to democratize Europe was co-written with world renowned economist, Thomas Piketty and two other French academics.

The manifesto has been followed by a draft budget for Europe. Fixed at 4% of GDP and composed of 4 key taxes (on high incomes, on wealth, carbon emissions and a harmonized corporate profits’ tax). With this money, the authors propose that four key social issues can be addressed: climate change, refugees, training and education and reimbursement for those eurozone countries hardest hit by the financial crisis. This manifesto grew out of the French elections of 2017, when Piketty was asked to provide the French socialist party with an outline for a European programme of reform.

‘Our ideas may not be perfect, but they do have the merit of existing.’ – Piketty

The manifesto to democratize Europe has since undergone several changes and revisions in light of feedback. But as Piketty pointed out in an article in the Guardian (2018), ‘Our ideas may not be perfect, but they do have the merit of existing. The public can access them and improve them.’ It was in a similar spirit that his co-author, Antoine Vauchez, spoke last night in Amsterdam. There is no doubt that many of the suggestions are bold, especially by the staid standards of the European Union. Perhaps most striking is the call for what is termed a new sovereign European Assembly.

National elections would be transformed into European elections.

This new European parliament would have substantial budgetary and legislative power. It would be made up largely of members of national parliaments (80%) with just 20% drawn from the existing European Parliament. This split is however open for further discussion. In order to democratize Europe, national elections would thus become European elections. It would also mean that national politicians would no longer be able to simply shift responsibility on to Brussels. They would be forced to explain to voters the projects and budgets they intended to defend in the European assembly.

‘ Britain will never truly leave the EU’ – Vauchez

The idea behind these proposals, is a reuniting of political and economic power at a European level. This would help ensure that Europe would be better equipped to deal with future crises of the kind experienced in 2007/8. It would also provide both the economic and political power to promote a more socially just and inclusive union. In such a Union the rise of populism, including Brexit, may well have been avoided, Vauchez agrees. The French academic told me however that he is not convinced that Britain will ever truly leave the EU. ‘There is simply too much shared history’ he maintains.

The underlying assumption behind this vision, is the importance of reconnecting ‘the economic governance of Europe with the representative project’ as Vauchez puts it. The French professor argued that the dominance of the economic governance of Europe, centering on the creation of the Euro itself, has resulted in a corresponding decline in issues of political governance. The political and the social have continued to function almost exclusively at national level. Perhaps this is not so surprising, since the Eurozone started as an almost exclusively economic project. The creation of the European Union was preceded by that of the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1957.

‘The European economic elite have helped keep democratic control at bay.’ – Vauchez

However as Vauchez pointed out, ‘our starting point for this Manifesto was that Europe has changed profoundly since the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the single currency’. Piketty and his co-authors are concerned about the rise of a European economic elite. A group who have helped to create institutions that ‘keep democratic control at bay’ as Vauchez puts it. Irrespective of political orientation, few would disagree that the Eurozone has found itself ill-equipped to deal with a variety of significant crises in the past decade. These include the financial crisis, the refugee crisis and the Brexit crisis.

These French academics argue that the current institutional framework of the European Union make dealing effectively with such crises almost impossible. In particular because the veto right of each country prevents any common fiscal policy. It is difficult to disagree. But this tension between political and economic sovereignty sits at the heart of the European project. The guarantee that member states would retain their sovereignty with regards to tax, pension systems and political structures, formed the basis for a willingness on the part of many, to proceed.

Northern member states reluctant to bail out their southern counterparts.

The so called North/South divide is evidence of this. Many Northern nations feel strongly that they will find themselves having to bail out their less prosperous southern counterparts. This is a highly complex issue that is further complicated by the inclusion of various East European member states. But it does not alter the fundamental question: has the European Union reached a point where further progress cannot be made unless member states commit to greater democratization? It is tempting of course to continue tinkering with the current structure as various members of last night’s panel suggested. ‘Looking for silver bullets’, Vauchez calls it. But history suggests that fortune tends to favour the brave.