Europe

EU Elephant – why Europe is still a dirty word in Dutch politics.

Europe is a dirty word for many national politicians in EU Member States. The Netherlands is no exception. This year, for the first time, the #EUolifant (EU elephant) went viral on twitter prior to the elections, hinting that a change might be underway. The rise of pan-European party, Volt, may be part of this shift. But how deep does this change really go and how has the pandemic reinforced the somewhat stultified status quo in Dutch politics? What are the implications for democracy at both national and European level? 

The national elections here in the Netherlands have raised the perennial questions of housing shortages, healthcare and education. But this year, the issue of Europe is also here. Perhaps the pan-European response to the pandemic is responsible for this shift. Despite the very vocal protests from the Dutch government against the introduction of corona bonds last year, more Europe seems inevitable. Are attitudes are shifting in a country where ‘less-Europe’ has long been a cherished campaign slogan for national politicians?

The democratic deficit

For years, the EU has been accused of running on a democratic deficit. This refers to the lack of democratic mandate from EU citizens who vote at national level for local politicians. They are unable to vote directly for those that represent them at the EU parliament in Brussels.  In national political debates, Brussels is conveniently used as a scapegoat for much that is wrong while local politicians take the credit for what goes right. EU citizens themselves thus remain confused or worse, blissfully ignorant of the vital role that Europe plays in their prosperity.  In Dutch politics this phenomenon has been particularly pronounced.

Common myths regarding the EU abound, even among professional, educated members of the electorate.  Perhaps best understood as a strongly held belief that the EU is a money-hungry bureaucracy in which the Netherlands has too little say. Stats show that in fact the average Dutch citizen gains far more than s/he contributes toward the EU. And, that the number of bureaucrats in Brussels is comparable to those in the Dutch government! As journalist and lecturer, Caroline de Gruyter, pointed out at a recent discussion in Amsterdam, Brexit has made it easier to talk more positively about Europe in the Netherlands. There is general, if unvoiced acknowledgement that the Netherlands, as ‘the port of Europe’, needs the EU, says de Gruyter.

Integration in disguise

De Gruyter argues that the Dutch are in fact very active in Europe. She compares Dutch politicians to shoppers out with their list of priorities in the EU, looking for like-minded partners with whom to do business. ‘Lots of things are happening in Europe at the moment and the Dutch are in all of them’ assures de Gruyter. But after the fuss they made about the corona bonds, politicians have to be careful how they play it, she explains. Certainly, Mark Rutte’s strategy regarding the EU seems to be ‘integration in disguise’ notes Luiza Bialasiewicz, Associate Professor in the Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam. It is definitely something at which he has become very good, agrees Pepijn Bergsen, Research Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House. Bergsen believes that this approach will continue for the foreseeable future.  

In spite of expectations that the pandemic might cause shifts in the Dutch political landscape,  Bergsen admits that this has not really occurred. De Gruyter puts it down to a tendency, seen across Europe, to ‘rally around the flag’. Matt Steinglass, Europe correspondent for the Economist, suggests that there has been a consensus on the political left, not to attack the government in a time of crisis. He argues that the left ‘were already low but the pandemic has left them paralyzed’. The result; a stultified political landscape in the Netherlands, underpinned by a somewhat misplaced sense of complacency that all is well. Steinglass cites the country’s relatively poor handling of the Covid crisis as evidence of an inability to change in response to changing circumstances.

Left out

Arun Chaudhary, American campaign advisor to Obama and now the Dutch Labour Party, argues that although there are a lot of parties in the Dutch system, ‘when you look at the data, you still have just two teams’.  One team, he argues, has a clear captain – referring to Mark Rutte, while the other, left-wing team ‘just has kids’. Perhaps this is why there has been a lack of real opposition from the left to the current government. Chaudhary agrees that Rutte in particular, is extremely well established as a leader. He is more popular than his party and this makes criticism of him risky for opponents. The pandemic too, ‘slowed the election’, he agrees.

Chaudhary points out that the political left has lost much of its working class support because it has ceased to deliver the kind of tangible results typically expected by its  supporters. He describes the left as ‘more of a life-style choice’ for the professional middle class. For these people politics is not so much about community building. It is comparable rather to the gym or club you join, the newspaper you read or the vacation destination you choose. This phenomenon helps explain the rise of populism across Europe. Perhaps it also explains the lack of genuine debate around the issue of Europe. It is the average working wo/man who needs to be convinced of the importance of Europe in their lives. But which team is able and willing to do this?

Problem lies at national level

As the initiators of the #EUolifant twitter campaign point out, the lack of genuine debate around Europe’s role in Dutch political decisions was still largely absent in the recent election campaigns. Debate at national level on vital decisions involving Europe is central to the democratic process. A lack of local debate on issues such as coronabonds and vaccination passports means that national politicians may find themselves out of touch with changing attitudes toward Europe. It also leaves the public with the familiar feeling of being left out of the loop when it comes to EU policies that affect their lives. Perhaps, as the EUolifant initiators point out, the problem of the democratic deficit does not lie in Brussels but much closer to home, at the national parliament level, right here in the Hague.

EU NATO

Will hard truths of corona rekindle EU/NATO relations?

‘The era of a somewhat naïve Europe has come to an end’, says Josep Borrell, Vice-President of the European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He spoke at the recent EU Defence Washington Forum hosted by the Brookings Institute. Covid 19 has highlighted areas of vulnerability in a manner both timely and sobering. The fight for narrative hegemony via disinformation campaigns, the dangers of unchecked foreign direct investment and supply chain dependencies are all major areas of concern.  In a post-Covid world, 70 year old EU/NATO relations are regaining something of their Cold War closeness. Indeed as China and the US appear headed toward another Cold War, the Trans-Atlantic relationship may well find increasing impetus for rapprochement via NATO.   

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April, 1949 by 12 Western nations. These included the United States, France, the UK and Canada. Germany would join in 1955. Designed to counter the growing expansionism of the Soviet Union, it was also seen as a way to discourage the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe while furthering its political integration. Article 5 of NATO’s constitution makes clear that an armed attack against one of its members is considered an attack against them all.  Today, 22  of its 28 members are also EU Member States. But as James Appathurai, Deputy Ass. Sec. Gen. for Political Affairs and Security Policy at NATO, points out, non-EU NATO members including countries like Turkey, Norway and Iceland, make up for 58% of the NATO population and involves 582 million citizens.

Who’s paying and how much?

The EU has relied on NATO for its defence to a large degree for the past 70 years. There have long been calls from successive White House administrations for EU members to make larger contributions to the NATO budget and increase their own defence spending. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these calls have become even louder since the arrival of the Trump administration. Currently, both Germany and the US equally contribute 16% to NATO’s central budget. It is a fairly modest $2.5 billion per year. It was also agreed in 2014 that each member state will increase its own defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2024. Few have yet reached this goal although NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that defence spending by European allies and Canada increased in real terms by 4.6% in 2019.

The European Union has recently (since 2016) shown increased interest in beefing up security and defence autonomy. The EU global strategy presented in June 2016 signalled a desire for the EU to play a more global role in security and defence. The European Defence Fund was launched in the same year in order to foster ‘an innovative and competitive defence industrial base’. The revival of PESCO (permanent structured cooperation) in 2019, designed to deepen defence cooperation among capable and willing EU member states, is further evidence of this trend.

However the departure of the UK from the Union and the arrival of COVID 19 have seriously undermined these intentions. In a recent interview with German Minister of Defence, Constanze Stelzenmüller (Senior Fellow at the Center  on the United States and Europe), described European defence policy as ‘on life support with a ventilator’. The comment was made as the EU budget (2021 – 2027) reduces defence spending to a maximum of €13,185 billion over 7 years. While Germany has relegated security to the last chapter of its EU presidency plan.

‘NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of our defence.’ – Josep Borrell, EU Commission Vice-President

It is in this context that EU Commission Vice-President, Josep Borrell, stated earlier this month, ‘NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of our defence. There is no alternative to it.’ Deputy Sec. Gen for Common Security and Defence Policy at the European External Action Service, Charles Fries, agrees that the EU would like to have a dedicated EU/US security and defence dialogue. But also maintains that Europe would like to take more responsibility for its own security and defence. ‘Covid 19 is a wake-up call for the EU.’

Borrell also acknowledges that ‘our partners around the world expect us to play a bigger role as a provider of global security and we are ready to do this’. Nevertheless, the European Union’s vision of global security provider has traditionally struggled with a lack of interest from individual Member States. National governments would rather spend on more voter-friendly projects. But the pandemic might help to change this.

EU ‘lacks a common strategic compass’ – German Minister of Defence.

Research shows that the pandemic has caused European citizens to become more aware of the need for a united Europe when facing large external threats, like Covid. Dependencies and vulnerabilities  in the health  and digital sectors are of particular concern. Nevertheless, as Kelly Magsamen, at the Center for American Progress, points out, Europe continues to lack a common view of what strategic EU autonomy looks like. Or, as German Minister of Defence, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, puts it, ‘we lack a common strategic compass’.

To this end, Germany will use its 6 month presidency to establish a common threat analysis. This will form the basis for further agreement on security and defence. EU leaders like Borrell, acknowledge the need for both hard and soft power in a post-Covid world. The reality however is that a lack of shared vision and reluctance to invest strongly in defence, makes the hard power part of the equation difficult to achieve without NATO.

Strong EU/NATO relations ‘not a zero sum choice‘ – Kelly Magasamen, Centre for American Progress.

The downward pressure on defence spending post-Covid is acknowledged by leaders in both NATO and the EU. Timo Pesonen, Director General for Defence and Space at the European Commission, points to a drop of 10-20% of turnover in the defence sector as a result of the pandemic. He warns that ‘we cannot again afford to take a decade to recover our defence industry’, referring to the effects of the 2007/8 financial crisis. One solution is to co-ordinate and share resources. This has however, proved problematic in the past.

Washington, particularly under Trump, has viewed EU defence ambitions with suspicion and NATO has raised concerns about duplication. However as Kelly Magsamen points out, the  US needs to be thinking very differently about EU initiatives like PESCO. She claims that strong EU/NATO relations ‘are not a zero sum choice’ but rather sees it as ‘mutually reinforcing’. More creative thinking around common defence would certainly seem to be the way forward.

Covid has provided a modest reminder of what a war-time Europe might look like.

EU/NATO cooperation on mobility, specifically military mobility may provide a blueprint for cooperation on other, more thorny issues. These include critical infrastructure, cybersecurity and even 5G. An EU action plan on military mobility was launched in March, 2018 to address physical, legal and regulatory barriers. The pandemic has highlighted the need for quick, efficient transport of medical and other essential supplies that are typically associated with war-time conditions.

In this sense, Covid 19 has provided a modest reminder of what a war-time Europe might look like. The picture is not pretty. EU leaders and leaders of the Eastern European and Balkan states appear to have taken this on board. There is real interest in strengthening NATO ties and agreement on the need for qualified 3rd party access to things like the EU Defense Fund. The two outliers are France and Germany who, for different reasons, have shown less enthusiasm for rekindling EU/NATO relations. But as President of the Brookings Institute, John R. Allen, insists, ‘We are at our best when we work together closely as allies’. History suggests he may be right.

Green corona recovery

Green corona recovery plan, could it unite Europe?

This EU budget will include an economic recovery plan for the pandemic. Traditional divisions between north and south, east and west may prove even more stark than usual. Many also question whether Von der Leyen’s much publicised Green Deal will survive a post-corona world. But what if the Green Deal could be re-purposed to drive economic recovery in Europe and bridge political divides? Many wealthy northern European nations are deeply committed to going green and may well be more willing to fund a Green corona recovery plan.

EU Commission president, Ursula Von der Leyen has spoken of a one trillion euro corona recovery fund. As yet, however, it is unclear where this money is coming from. The EU has a variety of so-called instruments or economic tools at its disposal. It uses them to collect and re-distribute funds to countries and industries most in need. However, it is not able to collect taxes like a nation state. So its revenue is entirely dependent on donations from Member States. At present, each Member State transfers approximately 1% of its national budget to the EU. The EU in turn allocates this money in the form of grants to selected Member States, foreign countries, farmers, researchers etc. The EU budget must balance each year, this means that the EU cannot borrow money. If it wants to make more grants, it needs more revenue.

The question of loans versus grants has been a vexed one. In general, the Northern member states led by the Netherlands and Austria, have pushed for loans, which will require repayment, with interest. The more hard hit southern member states, including Spain and Italy, have called for more grants or money transfers which will not require repayment. Italy even raised the idea of issuing coronabonds – mutualized debt, provided through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These differences are not new.

European Stability Mechanism credit lines to come with minimal strings attached.

The financial crisis of 2008 raised similar divisions between the more frugal, debt-wary north and the less stringent south. It took much wrangling and negotiation last month to reach agreement on the terms of the credit lines associated with the ESM. All member states will now have access to 2% of their GDP for corona related costs including prevention. The loans will come at very low cost, around 0.1% with maturities of 10 years. This €240 billion package should be available from 15th May. The Commission has proposed that these loans be free of normal conditions such as debt sustainability. Brussels will simply check that the funds are used for coronavirus related health spending and no more.

But what of post-corona economic recovery measures?  Eurozone economies are expected to shrink by 7.4% this year – the worst recession in the Union’s history. National politicians will come under increasing pressure from their respective electorates to deliver, as unemployment rises and businesses close. Whatever the final amount and mix of the EU corona recovery plan, the issue of how exactly this money will be spent is crucial.

No discussion thus far about how exactly corona recovery funds will be spent.

Director of the Bruegel Institute, Guntram B. Wolff, points out that there has been little discussion and no agreement thus far on which companies and industries will benefit from EU support in the recovery period. Wolff worries that member states will support different companies and industries based on political rather than economic concerns. The result, could be fragmentation of the single market. This in turn will weaken the EU economy, just when it needs all the strength it can muster. Belgian economist, Andre Sapir, agrees that ‘coordination is absolutely central to all economic solutions to this crisis.’

The EU Green Deal is Von der Leyen’s flagship initiative. Upon launch in December last year she described it as ‘Europe’s man-on-the-moon moment’. Described by some as ambitious and others as merely a set of targets, nothing similar has been attempted before. Economic progress since the industrial revolution has been heavily reliant on fossil fuels. It is as Jeffrey Sachs says, ‘the first comprehensive plan to achieve sustainable development in any major world region.’

‘Going green might be less painfully done now’ – Guntram B. Wolff.

The New Green Deal will involve an overhaul of nearly every major aspect of the EU economy, including energy, food, transport and manufacturing. Clearly this is not going to be easy. But a comprehensive response to the economic effects of the pandemic will require similar attention to all aspects of the economy. Under the circumstances, ‘going green might be less painfully done now’ says Wolff, as switching costs may be lower.

The Green Deal is going to cost money. The plan involves allocating 25% of the EU budget to climate action. In order to pay for this, the EU wants to reallocate funds from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and infrastructure toward environmental protection. The plan also makes mention of various initiatives designed to make future EU financing for Member States dependent on compliance with Green practices.

The European economic governance framework, for example, may be strengthened in order to incentivise green public investment. Further, the European Investment Bank will be supported in its efforts to become a climatebank. A Just Transition Fund has also been proposed to provide assistance to companies and regions to go green. Countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have thus far pushed back against the plan. They are all heavily dependent on fossil fuels and their economies less developed than those of Western Europe.

Why not make it Green?

Tying the corona recovery package to the Green  Deal would not be easy. But given that large amounts of EU funding is going to have to be distributed and accounted for in the wake of the pandemic, why not make it Green? So far discussions have been largely economic, but the EU suffers from a lack of political unity. The real question then is, could a Green corona recovery plan, provide that much needed unity? A goal behind which the majority of Europeans and their Member States could get behind?

Would Northern states be more willing to put their hard earned money into the communal pot, knowing that it would be used to help further Europe’s green transition? Would this idea be one that national politicians could sell to their voters? This time last year Greek economist and politician, Yanis Varouvakis, suggested that a radical Green New Deal has the potential to unite progressives across Europe. Could a green corona recovery plan prove to be the great leveller across north and south, east and west?

EU corona

Carpe corona: will the EU seize this moment and lead?

Coronavirus has spread from the wet markets of Wuhan, China, to the world. Each day new measures to contain its spread are announced, each day the death toll rises. Life in the time of corona is strangely like pressing the pause button and the fast forward button at the same time. In one sense lock down and social isolation have created a feeling of timelessness. At the same time there is an incredible sense of urgency as governments, scientists and health experts rush to find measures to contain the pandemic.  ‘Emergencies fast-forward historical processes’ as Harari put it. The EU project is one of the most ambitious in modern history. Will the coronavirus help to fast forward the creation of a stronger, more integrated European Union? One with the confidence to lead when leadership is so sorely needed?    

As a pandemic, corona virus is a global phenomenon that requires a global response. Although nations have thus far responded individually, there is increasing pressure on leaders to unite and share expertise and resources in the face of an enemy that knows no borders. A microcosm of the global system, and the new epicenter of the corona outbreak, the EU has thus far been characterized by a lack of real leadership at supranational level. Member states have hunkered down with national governments coordinating their own individual responses to the virus. But there are signs that this is changing.

“Extraordinary times require extraordinary measures.” – Christine Lagarde

Last Friday, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced a €750 billion stimulus package. It was accompanied by a statement from ECB president, Christine Lagarde, that, ‘Extraordinary times require extraordinary action’.  Greek bonds will also be included in the bank’s asset purchases for the first time. Further, EU Commission president, Ursula von de Leyden stated that the EU is also willing to consider backing common debt issuance in the eurozone in the form of coronabonds. ‘If they help and if they are correctly structured, they will be used.” Von de Leyden said. Perhaps more importantly, two of the staunchest resistors to debt pooling in the eurozone, Germany and the Netherlands, agreed for the first time last week, to consider this option. 

Closer fiscal union has been a sticking point for a long time in the eurozone. The wealthy northern member states have been reluctant to take on the debt of the ‘less disciplined’ southern economies. However countries like Italy, Spain and Greece provide markets for much of the north’s goods and services. Not to mention cheap holidays, second homes, food and drink.  The financial crisis highlighted the north/south divide. A civil war, in financial terms, broke out between the two regions. The sacrificial lamb was Greece – small and guilty enough to be bullied but not big enough to require a serious overhaul of the eurozone debt mechanisms. Covid 19 is different. It cares little about who has balanced their books and who hasn’t. The pandemic is threatening all sectors of eurozone economies and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

How things have changed!

One of the most tangible and dramatic results of the financial crisis and the eurozone’s struggle to coordinate a response to it, was Brexit. It did not happen immediately but June, 2016, saw Britain vote to leave the European Union. The ensuing process has been long and arduous. Just a little over two weeks ago, I attended an event dedicated to discussion of a final Brexit deal. At the time, British Ambassador to the Netherlands, Peter Wilson, described himself as ‘chipper’, in the wake of the clarity brought by recent British elections. He reiterated the UK’s desire for a Canada-style deal, based on precedent. There was substantial discussion about Prime Minister, Boris Johnson’s ability to ‘sell’ the deal back home, given the no compromise attitude that brought him to power. How things have changed since!  

Boris Johnson, like his counter-parts across the globe, is now struggling to coordinate an effective response to corona virus. Britain will not be eligible for the above mentioned stimulus package nor indeed any further relief, yet to come. Corona is changing the landscape of Johnson’s premiership, shifting it away from nationalist concerns over sovereignty and escape from the long arm of the European Court of Justice. It now finds itself confronted by a pandemic that is putting the healthcare system and economy under pressure hitherto unimagined. Suddenly Brexit is revealed for what it really is: a somewhat misguided response to a yearning for Britain’s glorious past combined with a lack of strong leadership at EU level. 

Fortune favours the brave.

The Union which Britain voted to leave has struggled to provide the kind of comprehensive leadership so desperately needed by 27 different member states, all with different cultures and economies, particularly in times of crisis. The 2007/8 financial crisis was  its first real test.  The EU came out intact. But dithering, disagreement and division meant that recovery was arduous and the seeds of populist rancour were sown.

Covid 19  has unwittingly provided Europe with an opportunity to step forward with confidence and lead. Numerous commentators have already pointed out the gap in global leadership left by the US. A pandemic like corona provides good reasons for individual member states to look beyond their national borders to the greater opportunities that a united Europe would provide. Fortune, as they say, favours the brave. Europeans and their leaders would do well to find the courage now to lead Europe and the world into a post-corona future.   

Democracy: (still) the answer to Europe’s identity crisis.(4 min)

Is democracy in crisis? Looking at Britain’s Brexit, Trump’s America and Salvini’s Italy, it is tempting to say ‘yes’. Common explanations have located the rise of populism in a potent mix of globalization and financial crisis. Yet two eminent political scientists, Francis Fukuyama and Dominique Moïsi, point instead to a crisis of identity. Speaking in Amsterdam recently, the American and the Frenchman highlighted the European Union as a source of both hope and fear for the future of liberal democracy.

Fukuyama admits that identity is the ‘master concept’ of his most recent book of the same name. In it, he argues  that the rise of populism is linked to a crisis of identity rather than economics. It is linked to a rising need for recognition by many of those affected by globalization. The desire to be recognised is universal. Yet, right now, invisibility is pervasive in society, he maintains. ‘The older white working class are feeling particularly invisible right now’. Ironically, both capitalist and Marxist schools of thought closely associate recognition with material wealth. Fukuyama accuses both Marxists and contemporary free market economists of viewing the world in ‘the same narrow-minded, materialistic way – they ignore the power of ideas’.

Macron is too bright, too young and accomplished, too handsome. – Moïsi

For his part, Moïsi locates the roots of populism in three key words: Anger, Humiliation and Nostalgia. Similarly Fukuyama, argues that the crisis we now face in Europe is one of both ethics and identity. The anger at what he calls the elite, is in part a product of the ‘explosion in inequality, real or perceived’. This in turn is a result of the humiliation which is reflected in movements like the gilles jaunes in France. A little humiliation can be a good thing, Moïsi says, as it can inspire one to greater things. However too much humiliation is very bad. For those in Europe who feel they have been ‘left behind’ by everything that is young, new and global, their sense of humiliation is overwhelming. Someone like Macron, increases this sense of humiliation simply by being what he is – too bright, too young and accomplished, too handsome.

If one is confident, an individual has no problem being French or British or Bulgarian and European. He blames his generation for failing what he terms, ‘the interrogation of identity’. ‘We have failed to teach a pedagogy of freedom and peace to the new Europeans’. And in spite of the optimism of Chancellor Kohl of Germany in the 1990’s, that the Erasmus programme, together with a combination of Italian pizza and German beer would prove sufficient to create a generation of young Europeans, it has not proved quite so simple. Those who have always lived in peace and freedom have great difficulty in truly understanding the value of these things.

‘European citizenship is only metaphoric.’ – Fukuyama

Both writers agree that the nation state has traditionally provided the framework around which institutions of a liberal democracy can cohere and gain credibility. However, nationalism as a source of identity can and has caused problems. It is frequently linked to notions of ethnic and/or religious superiority. Moïsi makes reference to Brexit as a prime example of this phenomenon. ‘Brexit is an example of a country shooting itself in the foot in the most dramatic but illuminating manner.’ For Fukuyama, the European Union is a union of ideas/ideals more than anything else. As such it may well represent the beginnings of his own utopian vision for the end of history – an international community, regulated by global structures based on the rule of law. Yet he points to the fact that power continues to sit at the national level in the EU. As such, ‘European citizenship is only metaphoric’.    

But the European Union has the potential to represent the sorts of ideas/ideals around which people can come together, in order to create the kind of broad, inclusive identities that Fukuyama lauds. Often accused of being merely a technocracy, its liberal institutions and ideals are  designed to help protect the right of individuals to choose. The right to choose, Fukuyama maintains, lies at the heart of human dignity. Indeed democracy itself ‘is based on a recognition of this basic human dignity.’ Thus, notions of identity should be centered on ideas rather than ethnicity, religion or material wealth. However, he makes it clear that this process begins with a willingness to listen to and accept opposing views. He suggests that metropolitan elites are just as guilty of this as their less educated counter-parts.

‘Will Europe be at the table or on the menu?’ – Moïsi

Even among the younger generations, Dominique Moïsi highlights the lack of  enthusiasm and appetite for the European Union. They are far more engaged in the fate of the kingdom in Game of Thrones he notes with typical irony. But Moïsi is unequivocal in his response; ‘what is at stake, is the future of democracy’. In a world where there is less America and more China and Russia, the question for Europe is: ‘will it be at the table or on the menu?’. For the first time in centuries, the Western model is being challenged by China’s alternative. It is a model that  does not include liberal democracy. For Moïsi, China forces Europeans to defend what it is they truly believe in, unlike other threats such as migration. It forces one to be excellent.

Perhaps the key issue here is trust. As Fukuyama points out, the trust of voters can never be assumed, based simply on the moral superiority of liberalism. The ongoing democracy protests in Hong Kong, highlight similar issues, on the opposite side of the world. A sense of identity, separate from mainland China, is underpinned by a growing lack of trust in the city’s leadership. The outcome is difficult to foretell but as Moïsi said, ‘One cannot play with history lightly’.

A return to Romanticism for Europe.

Neo-romanticism: the answer to Europe’s problems? (3 min)

Simon Strauss has been hailed as Germany’s new wunderkind. A millennial author whose debut novel, ‘Seven Nights’, has been described as ‘a passionate, fearless battle cry’ and a manifesto for the millennial generation, by the German press. I recently heard him speak in Amsterdam about his  vision for the future. A vision that centers around a focus on feeling, in the Romantic tradition of 19th century Europe. He is part of a wider resurgence of neo-romanticism in Germany.  

Strauss hails from Berlin. He has recently completed his Doctorate in History and is a critic for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.  His father is also a well-known writer, Botho, whose plays are among some of the most widely performed in Germany. In all these ways, the young Strauss is the quintessential millennial. Born, as he puts it, into ‘the made bed of wealth’. An inheritor of ‘a liberality that was and is no longer a promise’.  Yet perhaps it is precisely because of his privileged position that his debut novel is concerned with what he terms, a ‘revolutionary tiredness …, a fear of not tackling things’.  Perhaps this is why Strauss is drawn to the passion and the focus on feeling characterized by Romanticism.

‘I yearn for more quarrels.’ – Strauss

The young writer is not alone in his interest in the virtues of Romanticism. Germany’s new Romantics have taken inspiration from Berlin-based philosopher, Byun-Chul Han. He champions the Romantic in the face of the seductive ‘smartpolitics’ of capitalism embodied by the ‘smoothness’ of iPhone and ‘teflon Chancellor Merkel’. Han argues that capitalism in the neoliberal era works by ‘pleasing and fulfilling rather than ‘forbidding and depriving’. ‘Instead of making people compliant, it seeks to make them dependent. To me, the Romantic world of Holderlin (German poet) is the world of the future,’ says Han. His series of talks on Romanticism at Berlin’s University of the Arts last year were delivered to packed lecture theaters. He champions authenticity and laments the eradication of difference.

The dark side of Romanticism.

But Germany’s relationship with Romanticism is not all wine and roses. The movement’s privileging of emotion over reason has resulted in its association with nationalism and populism  of the kind found in the rise of the National Socialists in 1930’s Germany. It was German writer, Thomas Mann,  who coined the phrase ‘romantic barbarism’ to describe the snubbing of rationalism in favour of a focus on folklore and the past. Appropriated by the Nazis, it is this connection that nurtures fears of a neo-romantic revival in Germany today. Yet links between populism and romanticism are not exclusive to the German context. The idea of American exceptionalism has a Romantic component too, as  Conservative commentator, Kyle Sammin points out. Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ approach is clear evidence of this.

However Strauss refuses to let what he describes as its ‘perversion’ by the National Socialists cloud its ‘original promise’. He draws our attention instead to Romanticism’s central role in the development of European liberalism in its emphasis on the individual. For Strauss then, Romanticism represents a much needed antidote to the ‘purely rationalist,  efficiency trimmed worldview, which has become so decisive for Western societies’. It is also ‘a plea for the wonderful, the mysterious’. As such, it provides a much needed antidote to the rational, technocracy that is the European Union today. In what Strauss describes as the ‘hyper-individualism’ of his age, he sees a yearning for ‘cohesion, trust and empathy’. A yearning that has been exploited by right-wing populists.

‘Europe is more than taxation and immigration.’ – Strauss

Macron’s recent call for a European Renaissance – laid out in his open letter to all European citizens in 28 member states, calls for a pan-European approach to problems of migration, defense and social security. Such a vision chimes with Strauss’s argument that the original idea of Europe was ‘a deeply Romantic one … in its focus on a universal community’. ‘Europe is more than taxation and immigration’ he maintains, ‘it is a powerful idea/l that can talk to both the mind and the soul’.

Ironically, Macron’s strong stance against populism and nationalism highlights the difficulty of separating nationalism and Romanticism. ‘We cannot let nationalists without solutions exploit the people’s anger’ says the French president. Strauss finishes with a call to his fellow millennials to ‘Again dare to raise our voices and dream of another world’. Perhaps a German/French rapprochement is not so far off. If so, Europe might find the long looked for balance needed to move forward.