China

How will China’s tarnished image affect global relations post-corona?

China’s international image has been decades in the making. Although democracy and human rights have never been high on the Communist Party’s agenda – phenomenal economic growth paired with a reasonable record of line towing with regards to international organisations and diplomacy resulted in acceptance by many Western nations of China’s authoritarian regime. Some even suggested that China might provide an alternative model to Western capitalist democracies for developing nations. But much has changed in the last 6 months. Corona virus has placed China under the world spotlight, not in a manner of Beijing’s choosing. What are the implications for global relations going forward?

Some of the less savoury aspects of just how the massive apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party works have become increasingly clear. From the Hong Kong protests to the mass internment camps of China’s Uighur Muslims, along with advanced surveillance schemes and claims of the debt trap diplomacy of its Belt and Road initiative – China’s image is showing signs of strain. And this was before the arrival of corona virus. The live and let live approach seems ever more difficult to justify. But what are the alternatives? Hong Kong provides a poignant example of just how difficult a change in approach may be.  

Increasing tensions between China and Hong Kong are perhaps one of the greatest sources of embarrassment for a nation for whom ‘face saving’ is essential. After months of protest by pro-democracy groups, local Hong Kong elections showed that the vast majority of Hong Kongers support the protesters. Contrary to narratives portraying the protesters as criminal thugs, bent on disrupting one of China’s most prosperous financial hubs, these results surprised even Beijing.

The end of One Country Two Systems?

In contrast to Beijing’s trust in the power of economic prosperity to ensure compliance, a combination of factors have created a storm that has proved difficult to contain. For years now, Hong Kong has seen its basic rights eroded and ‘reinterpreted’ by Beijing and its supporters. This, in combination with a lack of social welfare investment in Hong Kong, soaring house prices and erosion of job opportunities by an influx of mainlanders have created rising levels of anger and discontent among Hong Kong’s youth. Beijing has now announced its intention to introduce national security legislation in Hong Kong. It will be inserted directly into the city’s Basic Law framework, by-passing local legislative processes. Widespread international criticism has ensued.

Close on the heels of the Hong Kong protests and Taiwan’s choice of pro-democracy leader, Tsai Ing-Wen, in January elections, came the Xinjian Papers. Over 400 pages of leaked documents, detailing exactly how ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang region would be ‘re-educated’ in government organised ‘training schools’. These internal documents were leaked to the New York Times by a concerned member of the Communist Party. They reveal just how different the sanitized narrative of job training centers for China’s Muslim minority is from the chilling reality of exactly how officials should go about organising the most extensive internment campaign since the Mao era.

Black-listed on China’s social credit system?

Beijing’s social credit system, due to come into full effect in 2020, exemplifies the kind of social control of which any self-respecting totalitarian regime would be proud. Although commentators say that its reach is still patchy, the ideas behind it are draconian. Credit is not only gained, it can also be lost and an individual may be black-listed as a result. If this happens, rights can be removed, including one’s right to travel, buy property or take out a loan. When this happens, as it did to Chinese journalist, Liu Hu, there is little one can do. There was no file, no police warrant, no advance notification, in his case. A lack of due process, makes recourse to justice extremely difficult.  

These are just some of Beijing’s less savoury projects. Much has been written about the so-called debt-trap diplomacy of its Belt and Road Initiative. Designed to bolster China’s image and extend its influence as a superpower, this trillion dollar project was coming under pressure before the pandemic. Global economic slowdown and increasing concerns about a lack of transparency surrounding China’s lending schemes were proving problematic. Rising debt levels associated with the pandemic have meant that many of China’s developing world debtors are unable to meet repayment schedules. China was a signatory to a recent pledge by the Group of 20 rich economies to cease collecting interest from poor countries for the rest of the year. However many large Belt and Road loans are “not applicable for debt relief” China has stated.

China’s struggle to control the Covid 19 narrative.

The irony of course is that the source of the pandemic has been traced to China, specifically, the wet markets of Wuhan. This has become an increasingly sore point for Beijing as Covid 19 continues to cause death and economic destruction across the globe. Numerous countries have called for an independent inquiry into the issue both with regards to the actions of the Chinese government and those of the World Health Organisation. So far Beijing has rebutted these requests and focused instead on forcefully promoting a narrative designed to salvage something of China’s international image. China as role model for its containment of the virus and later as benefactor to other, less prepared countries. It continues to insist on Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO, although the latter’s handling of the pandemic has been among the most effective in the world.

What does the future hold? At a recent Chatham House rules event, a number of experts on China drew on the country’s history in order to  provide a context for its future path. More than one pointed to the importance of the Chinese narrative of their history staring in the 5th century BC. Their power and dominance continued right up until 1900. After which came the so-called century of humiliation for China. This ended in the 1970’s as China came out of isolation and focused on inclusion in global governance institutions and wider international acceptance. By 2010, China was ready to step forward into a more assertive role . In the last few years in particular, its actions in the South China Sea, border disputes with India and an ongoing trade war with the US highlight an increasingly assertive approach to international relations.

Is it simply a matter of time?

Rising Chinese nationalism has traditionally gone hand-in-hand with the nation’s increasing global dominance. Yet the political and economic fall out of the pandemic have upset this trajectory. China’s image has been undeniably tarnished by the corona virus. What’s more, the ensuing scrutiny has only served to highlight other areas of dubious dealings. Ultimately, the answer lies with the Chinese people themselves. Will the Communist Party continue to be able to provide sufficient prosperity to quieten a desire for more individual rights and freedoms? History suggests not, especially given events in Hong Kong and Taiwan. But the time scale of rising discontent, is also a major factor and that is far more difficult to gauge.  

The trouble with Hong Kong (4 min)

As protests in Hong Kong escalate, the tensions inherent in the one country, two systems approach are becoming increasingly apparent, in spite of Beijing’s claims to the contrary. Hong Kong has one of the freest economies in the world but what of its political system? What is the price of freedom and who is willing to pay it?

I arrived in Hong Kong in 2014. As a new member of Hong Kong’s large expat community, I  remember making my way down to the streets Mong Kok, one of the centers of the so-called Umbrella Revolution. Mong Kok is a large, working man’s district known among tourists for its markets. The ordered, peacefulness of the protests was difficult to appreciate unless seen first-hand. Students had set up desks in order to do their homework and tents and bottles of water were neatly stored for later use. All agreed that this was ‘typical Hong Kong’ – orderly and law-abiding to the extreme. These protests eventually petered out as increasing numbers of the city’s residents grew alarmed about the economic consequences of movements like Occupy Central that brought the CBD to a standstill.

Hong Kong’s colonial history is not China’s

Although Hong Kong is geographically and ethnically part of China, this small territory has enjoyed a very different history, at least for the last couple of centuries. Under British control for more than 150 years, Hong Kong developed in quite a different manner from mainland China, which came under Communist rule in 1949. With British handover in 1997, Hong Kong became a special administrative region within China. This meant that for the next 50 years, at least, the territory would have its own mini-constitution, called the Basic Law. Under Basic Law various rights including an independent legal system, based on the English Common Law, multiple political parties, free speech and freedom of assembly were guaranteed. But the word of the law and the spirit of the law can diverge. Since 1997, a variety of interpretations of these laws by Beijing have clashed with those of Hong Kong citizens. This in turn has led to numerous protests over the years as Hong Kongers have seen their special rights hollowed out by interference from Beijing.  

Greater integration, greater economic prosperity?

The one country, two systems mantra, is one which Beijing has repeatedly reinforced in its  approach to Hong Kong. Building on notions of shared ethnicity and a common desire for economic prosperity, the Chinese Communist Party has made no secret of the fact that it sees this approach as a vehicle for peaceful, prosperous integration. Indeed Hong Kong and Macau are set to play key roles in an ambitious economic development plan released in February this year. The region, termed the Greater Bay Area (GBA), incorporates 11 cities, of which the 9  least developed are in Guangdong province.

The GBA plan is designed to build a cooperative framework between Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong to facilitate integration, including that of all three regulatory environments. Such suggestions have understandably given rise to concern. The GBA is an excellent example of how the mainland views  prosperity and integration as synonymous. It fits very well with the long-term approach of the Chinese Communist Party –  prioritize economic growth and prosperity and this will foster the necessary loyalty and contentment among citizens. Why would such an approach not work with Hong Kong?

The price of freedom

The problem is political . Specifically political freedom. The kind which Hong Kong’s Basic Law was designed to provide. Although the current protests were triggered by an attempt to push through a controversial extradition law, protesters are now calling for more. They are demanding the universal suffrage which was promised them in 2017 but never materialised. Some are even demanding the liberation of Hong Kong itself. Although the most vocal and recently violent protesters are found among the younger generation – one expat onlooker described a recent violent protest in Sha Tin, as ‘a massive temper tantrum with a load of kids – underlying problems run deep. Since hand-over, economic inequality in Hong Kong has grown. In one of the richest economies in the world, social systems are remarkably underdeveloped. Hong Kongers increasingly see this situation as a result of indifferent leadership imposed by Beijing.

For the younger generation the situation is intolerable. One Hong Kong student, 19 year old Frances Hui, wrote, ‘ I am from a city owned by a county that I don’t belong to’. The demands of young pro-democracy leaders like, Joshua Wong, highlight the increasing ideological differences between Hong Kong and mainland China. Beijing has very little experience dealing with such protests. The Communist Party’s response has typically been immediate and violent suppression. Tienanmen Square is a case in point. As are the thinly veiled threats of the Chinese police force performing riot drills on the Shenzhen/Hong Kong border. Beijing officials have recently reiterated that they will not allow Hong Kong’s beleaguered Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, to resign and that protesters must be punished.

The doublethink of ‘one country, two systems’

A number of local commentators have suggested more democratic ways of de-escalating the violence. These include investigating police violence, aswell as attacks by men dressed in white believed to have Triad links, re-evaluating the Basic Law and addressing the housing shortage, as a start. But Beijing is unaccustomed to this sort of democratic  compromise. Unquestioning loyalty and obedience from citizens is the norm. It is also what the Communist Party system relies upon to remain in power. And there’s the rub. One country will struggle to support two systems as radically different as those of Hong Kong and its mainland guardian. The days of such an approach were thus numbered from the start. Only Beijing doublespeak could suggest otherwise. ‘No matter what happens to the protest movement, we will reclaim the democracy that belongs to us, because time is on our side.’ Wong wrote in a recent article for the New York Times. Perhaps it is.