abraham accords

The Abraham Accords: is economics the answer to peace in the Middle East?

The Middle East has proved a consistent source of challenge for the most able diplomats and the greatest statesmen. The recent signing of the Abraham Accords marks the normalization of relations between Israel and the two Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. On the back of these agreements, President Trump has been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize. However critics claim that they do little to address the Palestinian question. Neither do they tackle the very real issue of rising sectarianism and its threats to a broader peace in the region. Will the economic ties that such agreements foster and the expectation that other Middle Eastern states may follow suit, prove stronger than entrenched ideological divisions?

The Abraham Accords puts a formal seal on pre-existing relations between Israel and the Arab states of Bahrain and the UAE. They include a formal abolishment by the UAE of its forty year boycott of Israel and pave the way for stronger economic, political and cultural ties between countries. They also include the establishment of embassies and direct flights between signatories. Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, David Schenker, foresees cooperation on trade, healthcare, education and even security. ‘We believe the agreement puts the region on a truly transformative path’ says Schenker. Without naming further potential signatories, the Assistant Secretary of State draws attention to America’s ‘outstanding’ relations with other Gulf states like Kuwait where 40 000 US troops are stationed. Other possible candidates include Oman and Morocco.  

Will the Abraham Accords lead to further widening of sectarian divisions?

The deal marks the beginning of full diplomatic relations between Israel and the two Gulf States since its declaration of independence in 1948. But perhaps it is the largest, most influential Gulf State, Saudi Arabia’s, tacit approval of this normalization of relations that is of most significance. Many agree that it is unlikely that Bahrain would have signed the deal without the explicit consent of the Saudi royal family. It is no secret that America, particularly under Trump, and Saudi Arabia are close allies. Senior Advisor to the President and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is in direct contact with Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman. Although the Saudis are unlikely to follow suit any time soon, the signing of these Accords may be seen as a strengthening of relations between Israel and the Sunni Arab states of the Persian Gulf against Shiite Iran and its allies.

Asked if the Abraham Accords circumvent the Arab Peace Initiative, which holds that peace between Israel and the Arab States should come before normalization of relations, David Schenker is quick to deny this. He insists that the new deal is an acknowledgment of the need by some Arab states to ‘put their own interests ahead of a particular cause’. This shift from idealism to pragmatism is better understood in a world where the price of oil is now at $40 a barrel and a global pandemic demands attention.

Is economic necessity promoting pragmatism over idealism in the Middle East?

These new economic constraints have put pressure on reform programmes started in a number of Gulf States as a result of dwindling oil reserves and increasingly modest oil prices. An average oil price of $60 a barrel is needed to fund the ‘cradle to the grave’ programmes run by many Gulf states, Schenker tells us. He suggests that it is economic necessity that has encouraged a greater willingness to take a more pragmatic approach to relations with Israel and the West.

But there is another side to this story. As many recently marked the 19th anniversary of 9/11, the issue of terrorism, specifically, Jihadism and Saudi Arabia’s long established role in funding it, cannot be ignored. As Senior Fellow at the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center for Middle East Policy, Bruce Riedel, points out, Saudi Arabia plays a central role in the development of the modern Islamic Jihadi movement. 

King Salman is ‘the most sectarian leader we’ve seen in modern history’ – Bruce Riedel

Prince Salman, now King Salman, has been the leading figure in the private raising of funds for the Jihadi movement since the 1960s. In the 1980s, Salman raised significant amounts of money for the Mujahidin in Afghanistan and he did the same for those in Bosnia. It was only in 2003, Riedel explains, when Osama Bin Laden declared war on Saudi Arabia that the Jihadi movement became a problem for the Saudi elite and successful action was taken to curtail the threat from Al Qaeda.

To this day, Riedel says, private Saudi funding for Jihadi groups continues and Jihadism still infiltrates the highest institutions of the Saudi state. King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, are ‘the most sectarian leaders we’ve seen in modern history’ maintains Riedel. The Director of the Intelligence Project cites the war in Yemen as evidence of this and suggests that a new US administration ‘needs to take a very hard look at this’. He also advocates the re-opening of discussions with Iran.

Saudis are eager to help end the war in Yemen – Assistant Secretary of State, David Schenker.

However, Assistant Secretary of State, David Schenker points to two recent attempts by the Saudis to end the conflict in Yemen. He says the Iranian-backed Houthis have ‘not been particularly productive partners’ in peace negotiations and ‘do not seem to be interested in a unified Yemeni government’. ‘We are all hoping that the Houthis prove themselves to be Yemeni patriots and not a tool of Iran’ says Schenker, ‘but the jury is still out on that’.

Sectarian divisions also promise to flare up in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut, where recent devastating explosions coupled with corona and years of corruption, have brought the nation to its knees.  Schenker points out that Lebanon currently has a 200% debt to GDP ratio and 50% of the population lives below the poverty line. The government recently resigned leaving a power vacuum that many fear will be filled by Hezbollah. This group is currently the strongest in terms of weapons and military force.

‘We believe you have to choose between the bullet and the ballot’- David Schenker.

The US do not want to include Hezbollah in the negotiations for a future Lebanese government. ‘We believe you have to choose between the bullet and the ballot’, says Schenker, admitting that the US and France, ‘seem to have very different ideas’ regarding Hezbollah. Nevertheless, the US has supported the recent French initiative for Lebanon. Describing it as has having ‘a lot of merit’, the Assistant Secretary of State says the US is in agreement with the need for concrete reforms before the release of international funding.   

The Abraham Accords provide concrete evidence of a shift toward more pragmatic, economically-based approach to tensions in the Middle East. Broader changes in both regional and global conditions have helped prepare the ground for such a shift. David Schenker mentions a deal they are currently working on between Lebanon and Israel. It involves the development of three of the most profitable natural gas deposits that straddle the Lebanese/ Israeli border. The money from such a development could help a nation in deep financial crisis. Schenker is hopeful that the passing of a sovereign wealth fund law would follow, in order to ensure the Lebanese people properly benefit from this windfall. Will initiatives like these, based on economics and fueled by pragmatism, successfully circumvent years of ideological stalemate in one of the most troubled regions of the world?